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THE OPERATIONAL PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA  
1954-1959

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Prepared by [REDACTED] August 1959,  
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(Based on data available as of 31 July 1959)

I. The General Strategy

After more than thirty years of unremitting effort in Latin America, the International Communist Movement embarked, shortly after the death of Stalin, upon a basically modified strategy in its unceasing effort to gain world dominion. This strategy, which is closely related to the regional strategy developed and applied at the same time to the free nations of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, is described, by Communists themselves, as the strategy of the national liberation struggle.

The most important of the new features to be found in this strategy are

- A. the fact that the economic and diplomatic strength of the Soviet bloc is being employed consciously and aggressively to supplement the activities of national CP's, the international fronts, and the Soviet intelligence services in carrying out the national liberation strategy;
- B. the fact that in the Soviet view, the military strength of the Soviet bloc is now so great that the mere threat of its use will be politically effective in blocking effective military defense of the Free World by the major Western powers and in inducing uncommitted nations to capitulate to Communist demands;

- B. the fact that the initial winning of power by Communist parties is now envisioned as possible, in many of the countries of Latin America, in situations which would permit the Communist party to complete the consolidation of its control under the guise of a "patriotic" defense of the constitutional regime against counterrevolutionary violence.

It is in this context that Khrushchev's frequent reiteration of Lenin's slogan "revolution cannot be exported" must now be viewed. For, while he places renewed emphasis on the responsibility of the Communist party in each country, it has been made clear at the same time that the nations of the Soviet bloc and the Communist forces in the major countries of the Free World have assumed a parallel duty. That is, to create and maintain an international environment in which home-grown Communist revolutions can thrive and be protected against collective security measures by anti-Communist peoples.

To the task of carrying out the strategy, the movement brought the experience it had gained in the preceding years, and the assets, in the form of leaders, activist Communist party members, sympathizers and collaborators, propaganda outlets, and techniques and channels for international coordination and support of the local effort in each country. These techniques and channels permit other parties, particularly those which, in the Soviet bloc, dominate and exploit the mechanisms and material strength of governments, to render essential aid, direct and indirect, to the struggle of the local Communist party. In spite of the failures of Latin American Communists, in both favorable and unfavorable circumstances, to win any major political successes in the first thirty-five years, the movement entered

upon the new phase of its subversive campaign equipped with certain reliable and useful (if limited) local capabilities.

Any effective campaign designed to check and eventually defeat Communism in Latin America or elsewhere must, it has been painfully learned, be based upon up-to-date, accurate and realistic knowledge of what the Movement is currently trying to do, how it is seeking to do it, and what the Movement has to work with. It is useless and in many instances counter-productive to treat the Communist movement as if it had learned nothing in the forty years of its struggle.

This is by no means the first time the movement has sought to use the "national liberation" strategy. It was first employed globally in the period after the first World War, only to fail miserably in Europe and Asia by 1929. It was again adopted in a modified form for a short time during the first phase of the second World War (1939-1941). Here it sought to exploit (by infiltration and alliance) the German attack on the colonial powers of Europe as a means of strengthening its influence with anti-colonial and pro-German nationalist forces. The strategy was, however, dropped hastily with the launching of the German attack upon the USSR. The third time it was revised and employed was in the period 1943-1947. In this instance, the gains made were sufficient in the chaos following World War II so that, with the support and the ruthless, brutal use of Soviet power, Communists were able to seize power when they reverted to a revolutionary strategy, and then consolidated their control of Eastern Europe. The gains made in China were also consolidated between 1946 and 1949. The effort fell far short of its goals, however. In other countries the parties suffered

defeats when attempts were made to revert to revolutionary violence, whether in civil wars (as in Greece, Iran, the Philippine Islands, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, etc.) or in subversive campaigns of violence, agitation, and terrorism (as in Western Europe, Latin America, India and the Middle East). The true meaning of the Communist national liberation struggle was brutally exposed in the Korean War, in which a Communist-controlled puppet state, guided and supported by the Soviet bloc states, sought to "liberate" through military invasion the portion of national territory which had been denied it by international agreements concluded after the end of World War II.

The current attempt to use the national liberation strategy began in 1954. Since that time, the Latin American Communists and their mentors in the international movement have been studying and refining that strategy and trying to develop tactical programs through which it can best be carried to successful conclusion. The lessons of the past have been studied, problems that have arisen in one country or another have been resolved, and particularly since the beginning of 1958, a general unanimity of view has developed within the movement.

The Essentials of the Strategy. In its most simple form, the strategy can be defined in the following terms.

- A. "National Liberation" in the countries of Latin America is not an objective - it is a method of gaining power.
- B. This strategy involves a program of action carried out in at least two stages.
- C. The objectives of the first stage are two... (1) The establishment of national governments in Latin

America which are either neutral or actively in opposition to the major powers of the West, primarily the United States, and whose internal policies give local Communists full freedom for agitational, organizational and propaganda activity at least equal to that enjoyed by other political bodies in the country. (2) The development by the local Communist parties and the other instruments of the international movement of the strength of the movement, in the form of mass membership, control of mass organizations (particularly of workers and peasants), and secretly controlled individuals adequate to carry out the second stage of the struggle successfully.

- D. The objective of the second stage of the struggle, as now authoritatively described, is to employ the forces under Communist control to establish and control a socialist state system and national policy, which would make possible progressive evolution to a Communist-controlled "People's Democracy" without the need for revolution. In this stage, the Communists seek to promote the creation of a constitutional regime they can defend rather than attack, in order to place upon conservative national elements rather than the Communists the onus of rebellion. The experience of Guatemala is revealing in this context.

All of the efforts of the International Communist movement (ICM) directed toward Latin America are designed to carry out this strategy. There have been debates and disputes within the movement in Latin America, particularly since 1957, on the practical questions concerning the timing and tactics envisioned for the second

stage but those who favored a less aggressive course of Communist action have, as in Brazil, been silenced, "converted", or expelled from the ranks of the movement as "capitulators", "revisionists", etc. It is over the central tactical question involved in moving from one stage to the other that important current debates are taking place within the Communist movement on "the role of the national bourgeoisie in the national liberation struggle". The authoritative current position is well-described in the articles by Rodney Arismendi which were published in May and June of 1959 in Prague in the most important theoretical journal of the International Communist Movement, Problems of Peace and Socialism.

The Development of the Strategy and its Consequences in the Program of Communist Action. At present the programs of Communism in Latin America are designed to:

- A. promote and exploit economic nationalism;
- B. promote and exploit the fear of wars, limited or general, and opposition to collective security programs of non-Communist governments under the cloak of the Peace Movement;
- C. promote and exploit trade unionist activity.

At the same time, the Communist parties of Latin America have undertaken to supplement the general political/agitational program with organizational programs to strengthen the parties by reorganizations, intensified indoctrination of Party members, better cooperation between parties, and recruitment campaigns among youth.

The current general political program had its beginnings in 1954 when the Brazilian Communist Party adopted its program at the National Party Congress in that year. A critical aspect of that program, dealing with the question of how an appeal was to be made to conservative business interests, actually was based upon a line adopted by the Party in 1952. In that year, when the USSR organized the Moscow Economic Conference in an attempt to develop business relationships with private businessmen in the Free World, two leading Brazilian Communists attended the 19th Congress of the CPSU. The party program in 1954 advocated -- as had a theoretical article of 1952 in the Soviet publication Kommunist -- encouraging "all those who hate foreign competition" to join the Communist effort to build a people's democratic government in Brazil. The efforts which have been made consistently by Soviet bloc governments since 1952 to develop trade ties with Latin America represent a continuing program of the movement.

During 1954-1955, the Communist parties began to look for allies not only among conservative nationalist business elements but also among radical nationalist forces, including both ultranationalist advocates of authoritarian regimes such as Peron in Argentina and Socialists of all varieties, which they had earlier been attacking. This program, which continues at present, is designed to give the parties access to the masses through jointly-sponsored united action on nationalist themes. Although this program produced results through the end of 1957, the past year and a half has brought serious problems for the parties in such countries as Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and Argentina where they have come more and more into conflict on domestic questions with those whose tactical cooperation they seek. This has in part arisen from the fact that



the International Communist Movement, beginning in November 1957 at the time of the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, has sought to gain its world-wide objectives by creating and exploiting increases in international tensions and by using threats and pressure on the nations of the Free World to induce them to make concessions on international matters as the only means of maintaining peace. This development, which contributed significantly to the renewal of the Yugoslav break with the Soviet bloc, is well described in the major policy statement addressed to Free World CP's in the May 1959 issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism by Vello Spano of the World Peace Movement and the CP of Italy.

Moscow has also ensured that Communist parties refuse to support domestic or international policies which, if carried out, are likely to deprive them of exploitable agitational issues. The parties therefore oppose equitable international and regional cooperation, as well as domestic legislation and action designed to solve national economic problems without recourse to socialization, or confiscation of foreign-owned assets, etc. They also oppose any domestic measure which tends to deprive their clandestine and illegal activity of protection against national security forces or to force them to operate in a wholly overt manner. In consequence, they have found it necessary to attack some political leaders whose cooperation they earlier tried to win. In spite of the need to make these attacks, however, the parties are being urged by the CPSU to stick to the general strategy. The methods of "uniting with" and simultaneously "struggling against" such desirable allies are widely recommended, and the past experiences of such parties as the Chinese are being studied in this light.

In 1958 and 1959, as the Arismendi articles and other articles in Problems of Peace and Socialism on Latin America reveal, there has been ever-increasing emphasis on the need for each Communist Party to develop its own tactics in terms of the national situation in which it works. Even the Soviet bloc governments and international front organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), International Union of Students (IUS), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) etc., have tried, in their programs aimed at Latin America, to pay more attention to national questions and peculiarities.

**II. Sociological Conditions, Situations, and Factors**  
**Facilitating or Impeding the Communist Strategy**

**A. Background Factors**

1. It is a truism that Latin America is an area undergoing rapid social changes. The pace of the transformation varies from country to country, but none is entirely unaffected. An old order characterized by agricultural economies and oligarchical political rule has been severely shaken, and the tremors of change run deep throughout the region.
2. A number of countries are embarked upon ambitious plans of industrial development and diversification. Recalling the stringencies the area suffered during both world wars when the supply of foreign manufactures was curtailed, and the effects of wide fluctuations in world market prices and demands upon one-resource economies, there is general agreement in these countries that they must broaden and strengthen their economies, through such measures as establishing local sources of essential consumer and industrial goods, broadening the limited range of exportable products, and stabilizing and increasing their income from international trade. The efforts at industrialization, despite much solid progress, have involved nearly every Latin American country in a succession of economic crises. Import costs have run ahead of the earnings of coffee, sugar, copper and tin in competitive world markets. Frequently unable or unwilling to cut back ambitious programs and sometimes determined to keep their development in domestic hands, governments have

borrowed heavily and resorted to the printing presses for money. Critical inflation has been the inevitable result, with obvious detriment to standards of living.

3. While economic development has proceeded rather erratically, the population curve in Latin America has been rising steeply. The rate of increase in recent years has been the greatest of any major area of the world. Between 1920 and 1955, the population of Latin America expanded from 90 million to 183 million, a gain of 100 percent. Demographers, while inserting many caveats, predict a total population of 206 million in 1960, 304 million in 1975, and 593 million in the year 2000. Most of the rapid rise is attributed not to higher birth rates or immigration but to a radical reduction of death rates. Demographic changes of the magnitude occurring in Latin America naturally produce a host of economic and social problems - land pressures, wages and living standards, unemployment, transportation, housing, and education. All these problems the Latin American countries are experiencing in varying degrees of criticalness.
4. Total population growth has been accompanied by rapid urbanization. It is estimated that in 1950 about 25 percent of the people in Latin America lived in cities of 20,000 and over. Buenos Aires with 5.6 million people, Mexico City with 4.0 million, Rio de Janeiro with 3.6 million, and Sao Paulo with 3.3 million

are among the largest metropolitan areas in the world. Although natural increase has been an important factor in urban growth and foreign immigration a minor one, the main source has been the movement from the countryside. It is generally agreed that in most countries urbanization has outrun economic development. Industry has been unable to absorb the flow of migrants to the cities, and much unemployment or underemployment has resulted. What is not clear is the comparative importance of each of the many forces which have given rise to this migration.

5. All the factors of social change in Latin America have aggravated an endemic condition -- political instability. From the time of independence almost no Latin American country has been able to develop a stable constitutional order. The coup d'etat has been all too frequently the method of political change. Until recent years, however, the Latin American revolution has commonly substituted one oligarchical faction for another. What is now occurring with increasing frequency is a true political revolution in which other elements of society are shown to have significant political power. Social and economic patterns are changing as well as the patterns of political leadership. It remains to be seen whether the new forces enjoying power will be more successful than the traditional ones in creating a relatively stable political order. They face tremendous domestic problems, and many of their constituents, often poor and illiterate, are not noted for patience.

**B. Factors Facilitating Communist Strategy.**

1. The rapid pace of social and economic change which is occurring in most of Latin America would produce in any country many acute problems and tensions. People who have lived in conditions little changed over generations find themselves buffeted by forces they have never experienced before. For them the Communists have answers that often seem plausible. Their troubles, they are told, are caused by the exploitation of capitalists and landowners and the rapacity of foreign imperialists, particularly North American monopolies. People beset by unemployment, poor housing, and rising living costs are inviting targets for the protagonist of any radical ideology. In many instances a carefully devised and practical program for economic development may necessarily be unspectacular, costly and slow to show results which directly appeal to the layman. Attempts to gain short-term political advantage through irresponsible but alluring descriptions of the prospects of such programs often lead to disillusion, cynicism, and other reactions which Communism is quick to exploit. Even Conservative elements who would never consciously serve the cause of Communism provide opportunities for the extension of Communist influence. Some ambitious businessmen seeking large profits and competitive advantage in this surge of economic activity are targets for more or less legal but in any case obviously attractive proposals by Soviet bloc trade representatives. Politically ambitious and unscrupulous individuals may see in Soviet offers of

loan, special purchasing agreements, etc. easy ways to political popularity and power. And, given the seriousness of the pressures, even responsible political leaders of good will can at times be victimized, because of their lack of adequate information and broadly international perspectives, by carefully planned and deceptive diplomatic and commercial campaigns by Soviet bloc states and other Communist-manipulated organizations. The systematic and conscious Communist attempt to identify and exploit this kind of weakness in our society revealed in policy documents of the international movement and of national Communist parties should provoke a searching examination of our national and individual consciences.

2. The urbanization movement has facilitated the mission of the Communists by giving them as a target a genuine proletariat of the kind Marx described. Many of the people flooding into the cities are poor and illiterate persons whose hopes of economic betterment are soon disappointed. They have been removed from the personal associations and the community environment with which they have long been familiar, are much easier to reach with propaganda than their rural compatriots, and their numerous grievances can be played upon. The Communist parties, wherever they have been politically strong in Latin America, have drawn most of their mass support from urban worker elements.
3. The Communists so far have made few inroads into the rural areas of Latin American countries.

but conditions in a number of countries offer promising opportunities. Land reform is a live issue, and its exploitation occupies a prominent place in Communist programs. It is especially attractive as an issue in countries where much agricultural production is based upon tenant farming or commercialized large scale cultivation. It is even more exploitable where such land is foreign-owned and the marketing of crops is in foreign hands.

4. Resentment of what are considered to be the consequences of foreign domination of the economies of the Latin American states is not limited to rural populations affected. It is a strong sentiment among almost all classes of people, although the reasons for resentment differ widely from group to group. Formerly this resentment was directed against both European and North American business interests, but as the role of the United States in the economic affairs of the hemisphere has extended, it has increasingly become an "anti-Yankee" attitude. The cultivation and exploitation of this attitude is ideally suited to Communist purposes. It is an issue on which the parties can agitate for a broad front of "national liberation" and they can goad even moderate political leaders to prove themselves good patriots. The alleged menace of foreign domination can be used to frustrate equitable bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements designed to aid Latin American states with their economic problems.
5. Political conditions in many Latin American countries facilitate Communist strategy. In



some places, the non-Communist parties are numerous, preoccupied with local competition and local questions, weakly organized, and riven by disputes over policy and leadership. This condition occasionally produces a situation in which the disciplined Communist organization can exert an influence much greater than its numbers justify. The forms of authoritarian rule which have been a common phenomenon of Latin American political life are in the long run beneficial to the Communists. By posing as militant democrats, the Communists win from liberal opposition elements acceptance, if only as a temporary expedient. These elements may reject Communist principles, but believe (or can be led to believe) that a united front is necessary to overthrow the existing regime. In other situations, the Communists, while nominally outlawed and repressed, have been able to win considerable freedom of action, in one or another sector of society (worker groups, students, etc.) by creating the impression that their policy is fundamentally consistent with that of the ruler. Whatever the Communists' role has been during a period of dictatorship, the conventional party organization emerges rapidly at the time of revolution, and it usually can make gains in the ensuing disorder and uncertainty. In short, political instability of whatever form produces a favorable environment for Communist expansion. It is equally clear that no authoritarian government in Latin America has adjusted or can successfully adjust itself to the fundamental changes taking place in

economy, society, and international relations without relying ultimately upon force and imitations of the Communist techniques of manipulating masses. To the degree that such governments indiscriminately suppress and attack all so-called "left-wing" forces, they tend to enhance the appeal of militant Communism to those who reject authoritarian or traditional doctrines.

6. The important part which intellectuals and students play in Latin American life is of potential value to the Communists. In countries where the educated class is small and is looked to for leadership, a few converts in this group can exert a considerable influence. Student groups in Latin America are as concerned with politics as their European counterparts, and much more so than their Anglo-Saxon ones. Many students, directly affected by the social changes going on about them, become impatient with what they regard as the backwardness and conservatism of their national leaders. Radical solutions are appealing, and many embrace variants of "scientific socialism" ranging from the Christian socialist theories through all shades of Marxism to the Leninist brand advocated by the International Communist Movement. It is from this intellectual elite that most of the present leaders of Latin America have emerged. In all Latin American countries, therefore, the prestige accorded the intellectual, whether professional man or student, not only creates a disproportionately influential group, but one within which the Communist unity campaign is of crucial importance.

7. A factor of perhaps less importance among youth than among those educated twenty to thirty years ago is the cultural affinity between Latin America and Latin Europe. Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, and Rome have traditionally been the centers from which the Latin Americans have drawn inspiration and ideas. In the cargoes and migrations across the Atlantic since 1921 have come the various brands of radicalism -- political, economic, and artistic -- which attained a vogue in Latin Europe. Among these is Communism and particularly its international front manifestations which acquire a certain respectability in the passage because of their apparent influence in the countries with which mature Latin American intellectuals are best acquainted. It is unfortunate that the more vital intellectual developments of Europe after World War II have had little impact on Latin America.

C. Factors Impeding Communist Strategy.

1. In spite of the instability of political conditions in much of Latin America, there are parties and movements of mass appeal which bar the expansion of Communism. Some of these are politically conservative and are ideologically impervious to inroads from the extreme left. Others, both political parties and trade unions, advocate extensive and radical reform and are themselves born of revolution. They are occasionally beguiled by appeals for "socialist solidarity", and they are vulnerable to infiltration. But

their leaders have in many instances learned that cooperation with Communists means admitting a Trojan horse, and have so far generally resisted alliance with Communist parties. Thus, to date, in all countries where elected governments are in power, the political scene is dominated by non-Communist parties. To the extent that such leaders have developed disciplined organizations and reliable, capable activists to lead local units of the party, they appear capable of resisting Communist efforts to deprive them of their following by "unity" approaches below the national level.

2. The successes of certain industrialization and land reform programs and of urbanization have enhanced resistance to Communism. A greater degree of social mobility, the development of a larger productive middle class, the existence of proofs that Latin American society can absorb and distribute the benefits of economic change have led more and more people to feel that they have a stake in an order that can be reformed and improved. These social trends may not develop fast enough in some countries to be serious impediments in the short term to Communist strategy, but as time passes they are likely to become increasingly significant. It is upon this factor that an effective fundamental resistance to Communist subversion must inevitably be based.
3. Another factor impeding Communist strategy is the conviction held by many responsible

leaders in Latin America -- political, military, commercial, cultural -- that the futures and fortunes of their countries are linked inextricably with that of Western civilization, in both its characteristically European and non-European Western democratic forms. Many of them, perhaps most of them, share the nationalistic sentiments that are prevalent in the Latin American countries. Many favor one or the other of the forms that civilization has developed. Yet they realize that the dignity and strength of each lies in the unity of all. It is also clear to them that the capital they need, the profitable markets for their exports, and the chance to win and protect national independence can only be achieved under a rule of law in the Western world. "National liberation" that deprived them of these advantages and freed them from these connections would be a suicidal policy.

III. The Contribution of International Communist Organs to the National Liberation Strategy

A. Efforts of Soviet Bloc Governments Designed to Supplement the National Liberation Strategy

1. In accordance with the Communist practice of concerting all activities of the international movement in support of the current strategy, official and openly acknowledged operations of the governments of the Soviet Bloc countries are lending considerable aid to the so-called national liberation struggle strategy in Latin America.

The Soviet government has never ceased since Stalin began the program of "building Socialism in one country" to acknowledge the organic and intimate relationships between state policy and the policy of the International Communist Movement. It was only in 1952, however, that the emphasis began to shift from a preoccupation with the defense of the USSR to the development of methods by which the economic capacity and other visible, acknowledged assets of the USSR could directly supplement the subversive quest for power by CP's in the Free World. Stalin himself initially supported this effort. It was only after his death, however, that the more significant programs began to have impact.

The effort of Bloc governments is expected to make the following practical contributions to the over-all program:

- a. to convince aggressive nationalist leaders and governments of both the right and left that they can with impunity take action in defiance of the interests and wishes of major Western powers
- b. to convince conservative nationalists, at least for a time, that their widely held opinions concerning Communism and Communist society are false
- c. to create new patterns of international trade which will weaken Western unity and combined economic defense capabilities
- d. to convince cautious, unstable, and overcommitted nationalist political leaders and governments that it is in their interest to exert and support pressure on the major Western powers to make concessions to the Soviet bloc, as the only means of averting general war.

Each of these contributions is expected by the Soviet Union to affect directly the balance of forces between the Soviet bloc and the West. Of primary concern to us is the parallel contribution in each case to Communist subversion at the national level in Latin America.

In the first case an aggressive nationalism which embarks upon ill-considered

international adventures or inequitable domestic policies directed against foreign-owned business and property becomes more vulnerable to domestic Communist demands for a share in power. If it seeks to withdraw in the face of determined opposition, it risks a loss of domestic prestige. If it persists, its urgent need for maximum domestic and international support again reduces its ability to resist such Communist demands.

In the second instance, the weakening or discrediting of anti-Communist forces eases the local parties' work of gaining allies and followers. In the third instance, the ability of the Soviet bloc to change its trade operations and credit policies overnight when political conditions in a given country dictate (as was done with Yugoslavia in 1958) places the nation which bases its economic program upon such trade and credit at the mercy of the Soviet bloc. Communist elements are thus in a position both to claim such trade and aid as a Communist contribution to national welfare and to blame the non-Communist national leadership for any economic pressures or failures which occur. In the event of a general crisis, the impact of such a shift might cause a national economic disaster. In the fourth instance, the involvement of nationally prominent non-Communist



figures in peace campaigns and in support for peace proposals advanced by the Soviet bloc tends to give respectability and protection and increased freedom of action to Communist "peace partisans", and to make bona fide non-Communist peace efforts more complicated and less effective.

2. Overt Soviet bloc governmental actions in support of the national liberation strategy have taken four principal forms: (a) propaganda support, (b) expansion of official representation, (c) establishment of cultural and senior official contacts, (d) the economic offensive.

The official propaganda and news services of the Bloc countries cover not only Latin America but the whole world with skillful "evidence" and argument to prove that all classes must unite to throw off the yoke of Yankee imperialism. Any action by a Latin American country which damages U.S. defense or business interests is presented as a progressive development; similar praise is given actions which damage or block important relationships with other major Western states. Cooperative action designed to defend Latin America against Communist inroads or to strengthen national economies without recourse to Communist methods or to aid from the Soviet bloc is denounced as a betrayal of independence and of the national welfare. The role of nationalists

in revolutions, strikes, and demonstrations is applauded, and they are described as leading "the broad masses" against North American monopoly capitalism and its local stooges. While the volume of direct Bloc propaganda output to Latin America is very great and is being expanded (China, for example, has recently begun to set up official press outlets and has given more radio time to Latin American broadcasts), the Free World Communist output, based upon and supported by the direct Soviet bloc efforts outside Latin America, is equally great. It is, probably, much more effective in Latin America, since its origin is partly concealed.

The second line of effort has been that of seeking greater official representation and wider official contacts. At present, the USSR has diplomatic missions in only three Latin American countries - Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico; the East European Satellites in from one to six; and Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam in none. The Communist governments have used every opportunity and channel to urge an expansion of official diplomatic and non-diplomatic representation, dangling the bait of profitable trade with the Bloc. Since 1955, for example, the Bloc has sought to use the Inter-parliamentary Union activities for this purpose. In 1958 the holding of the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in Rio de Janeiro gave Bloc delegations

the chance to campaign for the exchange of diplomatic missions and to hint at great trade possibilities. Other touring groups and Bloc friendship societies too, through general campaigns and discreet efforts to enlist the cooperation of influential individuals, have tried to promote such representation. The work of local Communists engaged in "the struggle for national liberation" would be greatly assisted by a larger number of Bloc embassies, consulates, trade missions and news agency offices in Latin America, for those missions could make the performance of the critical functions of coordination, advice, and covert aid much easier. They also would increase the impact of the world-wide Communist propaganda apparatus.

A third kind of effort has been the promotion of cultural contacts. Nearly all the Bloc governments have been active in this field. They have used these contacts, with varying degrees of subtlety, first to discredit the conventional charges against Communists and the derogatory descriptions of the Communist societies, second to cultivate carefully selected non-Communists, and, third, to establish a precedent for the development of official contacts.

Finally and most importantly, the Bloc governments have carried on a campaign for increased trade as a means of "freeing" the Latin American countries from their dependence on the imperialist powers.

This is a campaign designed primarily to appeal to "bourgeois elements" in official and business circles; it also is used to appeal to worker groups, to whom it is described as a solution to wage and living standard problems. Bloc trade has increased: in 1958, total Latin American direct trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc registered a gain of 30 percent over 1957; however, this increase is largely due to a much greater proportionate increase in Bloc-Argentine trade. Argentina last year also negotiated the first large credit agreement (\$100 million for the purchase of petroleum equipment) made by a Latin American government with the USSR. However, in no instance to date has this campaign developed to the point where there is hazardous dependence upon trade contacts with the Bloc. The impending visit of Deputy Premier Mikoyan to the area will represent an important effort to bid for further increase in trade with the Soviet Bloc.

Although in each of these fields of effort the Bloc governments can claim that they have assisted the strategy of the local Communists, it is doubtful whether on balance they have so far been of much help. Their failure to contribute substantially to the strategy designed for Latin America results from Soviet--and to a lesser extent, Chinese--actions which run counter to their professions; the experiences of countries of the Middle

East and Asia, where the strategy unfolded more rapidly, are sobering exposures of the cruder aspects of the Bloc governmental role in events. It takes a good deal of skillful talk about peace, anti-imperialism and national liberation to divert attention from Hungary and Tibet even among those as remotely affected as the Latin American publics. Even the less well publicized intensifications of skillful Communist campaigns against believers of all faiths in the countries of the Soviet Bloc have impact on those who actively look for the truth. Campaigns for expanded diplomatic contacts are not aided when Mexico and Argentina must expel Bloc emissaries for subversive activity. A real trade offensive will require more attractive wares, in prices and quality and form of payment, than the Bloc has so far been willing to offer. We should probably not take too much satisfaction in the comparative failure of the USSR and the other Bloc governments to give an added weight to the efforts of the Latin American parties. Their efforts elsewhere prove that they may well go to even greater lengths than they have so far if, in their opinion, there is still a chance to achieve a worthwhile result in one or more key countries.

B. International Communist Trade Union  
Activity in Support of the National Liberation  
Strategy in Latin America

The current campaign through international trade union channels to strengthen and improve Communist operations in the field of Latin American labor was begun at the 8th Session of the General Council of the WFTU held in Sofia 27 September-3 October 1956. This was a part of the general Communist effort, after the confusion created by Khrushchev's secret speech, to tighten controls and develop the aggressive aspects of the current strategy.

It is clear that, without a substantial gain in influence and control in the trade union field, the second or "socialist state" phase of the national liberation strategy of gaining power could never be carried out successfully. This fact was made crystal clear to the Communists of the Free World by Mao Tse-tung in a much publicized and studied document issued at the end of 1956.

A resolution adopted at the WFTU meeting called for (1) support of the peace policy and anti-colonial policy on a national level, (2) support of all measures aimed at strengthening the unity of labor, (3) developing exchanges of delegations of workers between "underdeveloped countries" and between the Soviet Bloc and "underdeveloped countries", and (4) improvement of press, propaganda and education activities.

Following the meeting of the General Council of the WFTU the International Communist Movement through the Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL) made a realistic appraisal of its strength in the Latin American labor movement. Founded in 1938, the CTAL had joined the WFTU in 1949 as its Latin American regional affiliate. The CTAL occupied a unique position in the WFTU. Both individual unions and national trade union centers of various Latin American countries are affiliated to it. Individual unions belonging to the CTAL are in some instances also affiliated with the Trade Unions Internationals (Trade Departments) of the WFTU. Each of the national trade union centers affiliated to the CTAL is also directly affiliated to the WFTU. The role of the CTAL has been that of a regional liaison organization for Latin America.

The CTAL Secretariat in early January 1957 circulated for discussion among Communist leaders in various countries a document which emphasized the losses which the CTAL had suffered through illegalization, repression, and non-Communist "conversion" of leadership of labor and suggested a number of possible actions which might be taken to develop continental labor unity. These actions included the stimulation of continental conferences of workers of the same industry and the reorganization of the CTAL.

Both the number of workers in Latin America who followed the WFTU line and the number of CTAL connections and links with workers had increased over the years, yet the number of organizations affiliated with the CTAL had diminished. This had been brought about by the fact that the trade union centers in Cuba, Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala, formerly affiliated to the CTAL, had been outlawed or had adopted an anti-Communist position as the result of new leadership. The trade union centers of Chile and Bolivia previously affiliated to the CTAL had dissolved themselves in order to join non-Communist trade union centers in their respective countries.

As a consequence of this situation only the following national trade union centers were affiliated at that time to the CTAL:

Costa Rica - Confederacion General  
de Trabajadores  
Costarricenses

Ecuador - Confederacion de  
Trabajadores del Ecuador

Mexico - Union General de Obreros  
y Campesinos de Mexico

Panama - Federacion Sindical de  
Trabajadores de la  
Republica de Panama

Uruguay - Union General de Trabajadores  
del Uruguay.



The Communists granted that they had failed to win as allies the leaders of national federations of trade unions and, therefore, had shifted their attention to the next lower level of trade union organization. Their realistic appraisal also showed that the CTAL personalities were so well known and discredited that they could win but few allies directly. These same individuals, however, continued to dominate the CTAL.

#### The Role of the CTAL

Little progress toward continental coordination was apparent after the circulation of the foregoing document in January 1957. It became apparent that certain Communist labor leaders were antagonistic to Vicente Lombardo Toledano who, although not a member of the Mexican Communist Party, controls the CTAL secretariat and currently serves as Vice President of the WFTU. This conflict was apparent at the 4th Congress of the WFTU held in Leipzig during October 1957 and again at a meeting held in Moscow during November of that same year. Both the strengthening and the abolition of the CTAL were suggested at that time by various CP representatives.

The future of the CTAL was discussed repeatedly by top CP leaders at meetings during 1958 and early 1959 but it was not until April 1959 that a generally acceptable compromise program was presented. Then, in typical Communist fashion, it was presented by Lazaro Pena, a main functionary of the CTAL and of the WFTU, during the

course of his report to the 19th Session of the Executive Committee of the WFTU held in Warsaw 2-5 April.

Pena called upon the CTAL to:

- (1) launch and coordinate all possible new programs in order to broaden the continental unity of the Latin American working people, even if this were to include the dissolution of the CTAL and the creation of a new organization;
- (2) create a committee of relations with the working people of Latin America based on independent organizations--those which are not affiliated with international organizations, i.e., Chile, Venezuela, Cuba, Uruguay and Ecuador--with working people affiliated with the CTAL; and with the Colombian Confederation of Workers (CTC) of Colombia, which is affiliated to the Interamerican Regional Organization of Labor (ORIT). Such a committee would in turn be able to ask for the cooperation of both the CTAL and ORIT.

### Tactics of Communist Trade Union Activity

The way in which Communist trade union leaders in Latin America were to carry out the basic policies described above was discussed at the 4th World Congress of the WFTU held in Leipzig 4-15 October 1957. S. A. Dange, Vice President of the WFTU and a member of the Executive Council of the Communist Party of India, in a speech entitled "Trade Union Tasks in the Fight Against Colonialism" laid down the following precepts which remain valid today.

1. The trade union movement in colonial countries should give its support to the measures taken by the national bourgeoisie and take an active part in carrying them out so long as these measures are directed against imperialism and are intended to strengthen the country's independence and develop its economy.
2. Trade unions should develop democratic initiative in checking corruption and waste in the measures undertaken toward national ownership which are financed by public taxes.
3. Trade unions should display democratic vigilance in safeguarding public property and protecting it from misuse, misappropriation or sabotage.

4. Each and every struggle in a colonial country to improve wages and working conditions has an anti-colonial color. The task of the trade union movement is to link the workers' economic struggles with political struggles against colonial domination.
5. The trade unions should pay attention to the mutual support which they and the peasants can give each other. Trade unions should help the peasants to organize and should support the demands of the peasants for land and better conditions and should act in solidarity with the peasants.
6. Trade union movements of countries fighting for national independence should participate more actively in the peace movement.
7. Trade union movements in countries which have long traditions of struggles have responsibilities to share their experiences with those trade union movements in countries fighting for their independence.

The language of these seven directives requires explanation:

The first clearly sets the limits within which Communist cooperation with nationalist forces is to take place. It also, for Communists, sets forth the justification with which they are to

explain and "prove" both their proposals for action and their rejections of the unacceptable proposals of others.

The second, with its term "democratic initiative" calls upon Communist trade unionists to inspire and support "spontaneous" actions by public-spirited citizens to expose and condemn corruption and inefficiency in governmental programs of social welfare and land reform, as a means of discrediting any individual or group which the Communist party cannot effectively control.

The third item, in calling for "democratic vigilance" directs Communists to gain support by organizing agitation against government officials and conservative elements on grounds of malfeasance or the misuse of influence. Campaigns to "protect the national patrimony" or "national resources" are logical extensions of such agitation.

The fourth directive requires the Communist to "politicalize" every campaign for workers' rights and economic benefits, by placing, directly or indirectly, the blame for existing problems and failures to win full satisfaction of demands upon the foreign businessman, capitalist domination of world markets, the big "bourgeoisie" linked with international business, etc. This effort is of crucial importance, since those who accept this thesis are ideologically prepared for recruitment into the Communist party movement.

The fifth directive which urges trade unionists to lead the organization of peasants is particularly important where the trade union movement is well developed among plantation workers (sugar, cotton, coffee, etc.) in countries which depend heavily upon exports of agricultural commodities, for the trade unionist there is likely to have closer natural ties with the rural community.

The sixth directive relates in particular to trade union "solidarity" demonstrations with countries such as Iraq and to the need for such "economic" agitation as protests against military expenditure, demands for peaceful trade with the Socialist bloc as a means of relieving unemployment, etc.

The seventh directive is a call for (and promise of) improvement of international support for Communist parties. It applies not only to such countries as those of the Bloc but also to such Communist parties as those of France, Italy, and India, which have had long traditions of struggle.

Soviet enthusiasm for the "liberation strategy" in Latin America was expressed by B. Ponomarev, a leading Party theoretician, in an article published in Kommunist in October 1958 which was entitled "The International Communist Movement in Its New Stage". Ponomarev stated: "The people of Latin America are all the more decisively increasing the struggle to defend their national wealth and democratic freedoms..."

outbursts are taking place which are sweeping away reactionary regimes and are loosening the nooses which the monopolies of the US had thrown on their economy....

"An important characteristic of the current struggle in Latin America is the continually increasing role of the working class. That is, the participation of the working class imparts to the national liberation movement in Latin America a clearly marked anti-imperialist character."

International Contributions to the Program of Action

The general policy established by the International Communist Movement is being put into practice, with the support, guidance, and assistance of the WFTU and its bloc affiliates.

Finances

Numerous instances of international Communist financing of Latin American labor unions have been noted. In 1957 CUTCh (Chile) was said to have received \$5,000 from WFTU headquarters. The money was received by Elias Mallen Bravo while attending a Conference of Metal Workers in Prague.

Rubens Iscaro, Secretary General of the Construction Workers Union and of the Movimiento Pro Democratizacion e Independencia de los Sindicatos of Argentina,

was forced to admit when confronted with the facts that he had received funds from the WFTU to pay the expenses of delegates to the First World Conference of Young Workers sponsored by the WFTU in Prague 14-20 July 1958.

In at least two instances funds were reported to have been received from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for use in fomenting labor strife. The best known of these was that of the nation-wide railroad strike in Mexico in March 1959. Sums of money in excess of \$30,000 (US) were reported to have been given to Demitrio Vallejo Martinez, the leader of the striking railroad workers, by the Soviet Embassy.

In June 1959 the WFTU announced that it had sent the sum of \$1,000 to its affiliate, the General Union of Workers, in Uruguay. The money came from the International Solidarity Fund of the WFTU and was reportedly to be used to alleviate the suffering caused by floods in that country.

✓ Guidance and Consultation

Functionaries of the Trade Unions Internationals of the WFTU have been particularly active in supporting the Communist program in Latin America. Giacomo Adducci, Italian labor leader and Secretary General of the TUI of Metal and Engineering Workers of the WFTU, attended the 1958 May Day celebration in Brazil, at the invitation of the Communist-dominated "Inter-union Unity Pact"



(PUI). While in Brazil, Adducci addressed the Seventh National Bank Employees Conference in Belo Horizonte, and the Sao Paulo metallurgical and bank employees' unions, and on 1 May was the featured speaker at a large workers' demonstration held in the Sao Paulo municipal theater. On all occasions Adducci promised increased WFTU aid and direction to the Brazilian labor movement. Similarly, Paolo Scarponi, a representative of the Trade Unions International of Textile and Clothing Workers, arrived in Montevideo from Rio de Janeiro on 13 March 1959, where he visited textile workers', the wool workers', and the shoemakers' unions. While in Montevideo, Scarponi claimed that higher salaries and guaranteed employment would result if trade in wool were expanded to "all countries without distinction". On 19 March Scarponi left for Buenos Aires, and on 1 April he arrived in Santiago, Chile. It is probable that his Latin American trip was concerned with the planning of the Third International Conference of the Textile and Clothing Workers TUI, which was held in Sofia in July 1958, and particularly with intensification of the TUI's activity in Latin America.

Soviet trade union leaders have also visited Latin America. A delegation of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, consisting of Yevgeniy Cherednichenko, Mafodiy Terentev, and Vadim Kotchergin, visited Uruguay and Chile in May 1958. The delegation arrived in Montevideo on 5 May, where they were greeted by over sixty persons, including Enrique Pastorino,

Communist labor leader, and officials of the Soviet Legation. Subsequently they conferred with local trade union officials and on 9-12 May attended the congress of the Construction Workers' Union (SUNCA), an affiliate of the Communist-controlled General Workers' Union (UGT). During this congress, the Soviets were visited frequently by Uruguayan Communist trade unionists as well as by delegates from other Latin American countries. The foreign delegates at this congress reportedly included Communists from Chile, Brazil and Argentina. It is apparent, therefore, that the congress in Montevideo provided an opportunity for the coordination of regional labor action with direct Soviet participation. At all times the Soviet delegates were in close touch with officials of the Soviet Legation, and Ketchargin, long a key figure in Soviet contacts with Latin American trade unionists and a member of the Soviet secret service, had a number of private contacts.

On 27 May the Soviet labor delegation went on to Chile, arriving in Santiago at the same time as the Soviet delegation of journalists which had been visiting Argentina. In Chile they conferred with Communist labor leaders, particularly those of the Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh). The group visited various national institutions, and were received by President Ibanez. Although a plenary session of the CP Chile's Central Committee was held on 29-31 May, the Soviet delegates were in Valparaiso at the

time and could not have attended, despite reports that they had actively participated. On 2 June the delegation departed for the USSR, transiting Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Rio de Janeiro.

Soviet contact with Latin American labor during 1959 began in February with the visit of Timofei Yeriemeyev and Aleksandr Minev to Chile. Yeriemeyev is a member of the Presidium of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Giacomo Adducci of Italy again visited Latin America this year to attend the Second National Congress of Metal Workers held 7-12 April 1959. A significant aspect of this Conference was the fact that fraternal delegates from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela were in attendance, thus providing the WITU's TUI representative with an opportunity for widespread contacts. Adducci himself is of special interest, because he has been used to carry out confidential and delicate missions concerned with trade union policies of Communist parties in Europe. As an agent of international stature, then, his mission during his visits to Latin America was undoubtedly important.

In May of 1959 Paul Delanoue, Secretary General of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Teachers Unions (FISE), visited Chile to attend the 12th National Convention of the Union de Profesores of Chile. The fact that representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay were in attendance

likewise provided him an opportunity for widespread contacts.

On 21 June 1958, Maurice Boye, a member of the Secretariat of the Trade Unions International of Public and Allied Workers, was reported to be visiting in Chile at the invitation of the National Association of Semi-Public Employees (ANES). He was accompanied on his travels by Waldo Grez, a leader of the ANES, and by Domiciano Soto Vergara, a Communist leader of the Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh).

#### Training

A labor school sponsored by the Confederación General de Trabajadores was reported to have been held in San Jose, Costa Rica, 5-31 May 1958. The school was supported by the WFTU to the extent of \$4,000. Of an enrollment of thirty pupils, fifteen were alleged to be Costa Ricans while the remainder were Central Americans and Panamanians.

The director of the school, according to the Costa Rican newspaper La Nación, 11 June 1958, was Alvaro Montero. Jose Amador Perez was the subdirector, Rodolfo Guzman an instructor and Eduardo Mora Valverde a lecturer. Three students were arrested when they attempted to re-enter Nicaragua upon completion of the school. They were identified as:

1. Domingo Antonio Sanchez Salgado, 43 years of age, born in Chaquitillo.

In 1947 the subject was reported to be a member of the Communist Party of Nicaragua. He is a member of the Sindicato de Carpinteros y Similares and a member of the Executive Committee of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores. He was mentioned by Carlos Fonseca Amador during an investigation as an active and important Communist.

2. Roberto Nicolas Zamora Suazo, 35 years of age, born in Leon, a shoemaker by profession. In 1947 the subject was Secretary for the Communist Party of Nicaragua in Leon. In 1949 he became the Secretary of Finance Section of the same Party and in 1950 was the head of its Statistical Section.
3. Tomas Pravia Reyes, 33 years of age, born in Matagalpa, a carpenter by profession. The subject was considered a Communist in 1957.

Of two persons arrested by the Costa Rican authorities after the school had closed, one was a graduate of a WFTU training course which took place in Budapest four years before.

C. The Communist Peace Movement in Latin America

Of all the international Communist fronts, none is more flexible and all-encompassing than the World Peace Council and the Peace Partisans Committees which operate at the national level. It is also necessary that we recognize clearly that the Catholic Church as an organization is more directly challenged by this body than by any other in the ranks of the International Communist Movement. Perhaps the best proof of the utter cynicism, opportunism, and deceit which characterizes the self-avowed atheistic, materialist Communist movement is the fact that it seeks to use in the activities of the Peace Movement in the Free World "patriotic" priests and representatives of the many religious faiths which stubbornly persist in the countries under Communist control.

We must also recognize that, as far as the countries of the Soviet bloc are concerned, the yearning for peace is as real as the wish for peace in the Free World. But the Peace organizations in the Bloc, rather than expressing this wish, are instruments through which Communist parties seek to focus the energies involved into campaigns of hatred and perverted patriotism. Three facts are well worth pondering in this regard. (1) The first criticism directed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at Malenkov was directed at his statement concerning the probable consequences of a war involving atomic weapons. (2) The first mass organization which the Communists sought

to reorganize and bring under tight control in Hungary prior to the bloody events of 1956 was the peace movement. (3) One of the most important reasons for the resumption in 1958 of violent attacks upon the Yugoslavs as traitors to the cause of international Communism was their refusal to accept the authoritative international party line on the subject of the struggle for peace.

The role of the peace movement in the national liberation strategy as of 1952 was one of the few topics to which Stalin addressed himself at the XIXth Congress of the CPSU. At that time he warned the Party faithful that the peace movement would not directly bring about the universal victory of Communism even though it could make a useful contribution to creating conditions favorable to the seizure of power. This argument is echoed as recently as May of this year in an important and authoritative article on the role of the peace movement by a leading Italian Communist, Velio Spano.

The article makes it clear that the mission of the Peace Movement today is the manipulation of the non-Communist, and even the anti-Communist. We hardly need the article to see this, when we know that it is the peace movement which has sought to exploit the burning wish for peace of the last Pontiff Pius XII to advance its own cause. But what the article adds is a clear picture of how those who now direct the International Communist

Movement seek to interrelate their peace struggle with the struggles for power.

Certain peace struggle campaigns conducted in the Free World we all know and have come to recognize for what they are. The condemnation of regional defense pacts in which major Western powers participate, or of bilateral defense agreements with these powers as "mutilations of national sovereignty", are obviously attempts to appeal to nationalist sentiment and to develop the national liberation idea. Of all possible arguments on these subjects, they are in hard fact the least useful in advancing the cause of peace. But, to the degree that they permit exertion of pressure or denouncing of a national government by its opponents, they do serve the Communist cause.

The anti-nuclear weapons campaigns are perhaps more complex. As Spano's article points out, there are other groups of a non-Communist and even anti-Communist complexion which have become active in recent years on this question and their sincerity cannot be questioned. In fact, it is very significant to note that one of Spano's main points is that the Communist Peace Movement must recognize the value of these forces and avoid policies and actions which could lead to direct clashes and open differences with them. It is in this field of Communist plans that they seek to exploit the Church. The national liberation strategy comes under examination immediately at this point, and Spano makes it clear that the objective of



Communists in the peace struggle is to exploit the fear of war and the forces of nationalism even though the two programs inevitably conflict.

To do this obviously requires of Communists great care and skill, and conflicting views on this matter existed in the Peace Movement through the end of 1958. Spano's article shows however that this disagreement has been resolved, for it specifies that the proper approach requires:

1. decentralizing of the organization of the movement
2. emphasis on the points of common interest with other peace advocates at the national and regional level and avoidance of emphasis on potential sources of disagreement
3. a cautious but persistent effort to link with the peace question those fundamental ideas and local issues which the Communists seek to exploit in the interest of the growth of the Party's power
4. a maximum effort to prevent local distrust of Communism and Communists from blocking or weakening the effort.

Decentralization is in fact being carried out but without any loss of control. At the Stockholm Peace Council meeting in May 1959 it was

announced that regional committees composed of representatives of peace committees within each region were being formed in order to permit concentration on issues of local interest. Communist effort to create a broader and untainted Latin American instrument for use in the peace struggle was in fact begun in May 1958 in Argentina when Communist Delegates to the National Peace Congress discussed a plan to organize a Congress of the Peoples of Latin America in December 1958. Although this plan fitted in with the directives given Latin American CP's in November 1957 at Moscow, the Congress was postponed in part because of dissension within the World Peace Council itself. The May 1958 meeting was also used for discussion of regional problems and issues, the situation of each national peace movement, and plans for Latin American participation in the Stockholm Peace Congress.

The formation of a regional committee of Latin American Peace Partisans, by providing a center for coordination and planning of work, increases Communist ability to prevent the peace campaign from getting out of control. However it also makes it more difficult, if opponents of the Communist strategy are alert and outspoken, for the Communists to conceal their hand in any broader movement that may be developed. It has been claimed that in fact the Peoples Congress discussed in Buenos Aires in 1958 is now being prepared, with "defense of national resources" as the central theme. There are also rumors that in Moscow in February of 1959 Latin American party leaders were urged to push this effort,

taking every possible precaution to conceal the Communist role and to place on non-Communists the main responsibility for convoking the Congress.

The choice of theme is an excellent illustration of the Communist method of linking its local national liberation campaign for power to the peace campaign. As early as January of 1959, for example, nine trade unions organizing petroleum workers in Colombia approved a program of action which included "championing the cause of economic independence, gradual nationalization of the oil industry, and use of national resources for purposes not governed by vested interests. In the program they also committed themselves to "fight for world peace." There is much other evidence in this report to show that it is a major aim of the Communists to bring their trade union assets into the peace struggle to increase their impact, and at the same time, to provide a basis for winning new members and followers for the party by incorporating fundamental Communist doctrine and interpretations of current events into the peace movement agitation.

It is also revealing of the organizational coordination of the movement that these Colombian trade unions elected a Colombian Communist lawyer, a member of the World Peace Council, as their legal adviser.

The peace movement's efforts to advance the national liberation strategy at the national

level in Latin America have long been pursued, in some instances with significant results. In 1952, the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican Peace Partisans promptly organized national committees for promotion of international trade as a sequel to the Moscow Economic Conference. Although their activity fluctuated greatly during the years, the Camera Argentina pro-Fomento del Intercambio (CAFI) planned to reorganize and strengthen its program in April 1959. It was, however, dissolved in that same month. The Peace Councils of Chile, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have been most consistent in their nationalist-oriented campaigns since early 1955. In Chile the committee has related the peace struggle to expansion of copper exports, and to the national budget. In Cuba emphasis was placed, prior to 1958, on the urgent need for new outlets for Cuba's "crisis-stricken economy". An even more obvious effort to "nationalize" the peace struggle, reminiscent of the Communist tactics during the Spanish Civil War, was the creation in Cuba of a National Council for a Marti Peace Policy linking the life and aims of Jose Marti with the work of the World Peace Council. Such programs, with celebrations of national anniversaries, became a common practice of the Latin American Peace Committees during these years.

In Argentina the first National Peace Assembly was convened in Buenos Aires in December 1955. Discussions covered not only peace, cultural exchanges, atomic weapons and

disarmament, but also "national sovereignty and military pacts," "the standard of living and a peaceful economy," and national production. Provincial Peace Committees in Argentina were also most active during 1956 in promoting protests, discussions, etc. on Argentine economic problems and expansion of trade, although not without opposition and some setbacks. The Argentine program reached its height with the May 1958 National Conference for Disarmament, International Cooperation, and National Sovereignty, attended not only by Argentines but by other Peace Partisans of Latin America and the Soviet world. Further expansion of Communist activities that followed this conference led to the closing down of the Peace Council in early 1959.

The intensification of effort in Latin America in early 1958 led to the return of key Latin American Communists from the posts they had occupied in the international Peace Council Secretariat in Vienna. Lobo Carneiro of Brazil and Alfredo Varela of Argentina both returned, to concentrate on work at home. Jorge Zalamea Borda, a key Latin American Communist long active in Vienna in both Peace and Youth front activity, returned in the summer of 1959 and is likely to play a key role in the regional organization and in coordination of its activities.

Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of Peace Council activity during the years since 1955 has been the number of members of Latin

American governments, legislators, etc., who have been involved. A number of these prominent figures have since dropped out of the movement. There were, however, twenty-two members of the Peruvian parliament at the Stockholm meeting in May of 1959, and ex-President Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico continues to support the Movement.

During 1956 the Peace Committee work was disrupted when they became embroiled in such broad and unrelated questions as the Suez crisis and the Hungarian and Polish crises. They were also adversely affected by the Soviet Communist attack on Malenkov's statement on atomic war. Several Peace Councils established contact with Egyptian and Syrian Embassies and Legations with offers of agitational support--and requests for financial aid! There was some effort to link Latin American anti-colonialism with that of Egypt, with but little success. Such bodies as a Teachers Association in Chile attempted to organize, with the support of the Communist press, a mass demonstration of anti-colonial solidarity in support of Egypt and the colonial peoples of Africa. In this agitation, they advocated that Panama follow the Egyptian example and nationalize the Canal. It is interesting to note how few of these voices have echoed any of the bitter lessons which the people of Egypt and Syria have learned in their unholy alliance with Communism since 1954.

It is indisputable that the Peace programs sponsored by the Communists in Latin America have sought to inspire participation by

leading personalities--both ecclesiastics and laymen--of the church. To the extent that the Communist sponsorship and direction of any campaign is apparent, rejection of their unity appeals is comparatively simple. However, where secret Communist sponsorship is involved, or when no identifiable link to the Communist Movement can be detected in a group whose program is consistent with Communist themes, outright rejection is in many instances as unwise as it is difficult.

The Spano article, designed to inform Communists of the proper tactics to be employed in peace struggles, brings out the fact that there is one crucial factor that must be excluded from any peace program if it is to be worthy of approval. This factor, the crucial pivot upon which the whole Communist peace struggle depends, is any challenge of the thesis that full responsibility for the cold war rests upon the capitalist imperialist powers. It was on this point that the break with Yugoslavia arose--for it is on this point, as Spano makes clear, that the dynamic force of the mass peace struggle depends. A position of absolute neutrality or positive neutralism is in Spano's view, acceptable. But criticism of past actions of the Soviet bloc as sources of the cold war is anathema. It is even possible that groups which deplore current Soviet bloc actions as making hot war more imminent can be tolerated, since Mr. Khrushchev himself has used the argument, as a means of exerting pressure, that the USSR is being "forced" to take drastic measures in its own defense!

But to blame Communism or even Stalin for beginning the cold war is forbidden. Spano's article also shows that the Communist movement is extremely sensitive to charges that its peace program is a tactic. Communists can therefore be expected to react violently to public airing of such charges even when the reaction leads to the failure of an alliance. While it may seem that such dogmatic sensitivity has little place in a cynically opportunistic venture like the Communist peace campaign, it is of great importance, as the basis upon which many persons support the Communist peace struggle in the countries of the Soviet bloc and in the ranks of Free World Communist parties. It was in fact this question of the sincerity of Communist interest in peace which lay at the root of many of the debates and disputes which have characterized the activities of the Peace Movement during the two years prior to May of this year.

D. The Role of Communist Youth and Student Organizations in Support of the National Liberation Movement in Latin America

In its approach to Latin America, the International Communist Movement has used primarily the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) as its organizational weapons. These organizations have engaged in vigorous activity in support of this national liberation strategy in Latin America during two periods: from their creation until 1948 and from 1954 to date.



The violent line taken by the WFDY and the IUS during the 1948-1951 period was first expounded at their jointly sponsored Conference of Southeast Asian Youth and Students (Calcutta, February 1948), where delegates were told that they should henceforth cease "to withhold offensive action against the reactionary governments of Southeast Asia." /Underlining supplied/

A policy of revolutionary action was inaugurated by the WFDY and IUS, which led to armed Communist insurrection against the governments of Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya and violence and terrorism in India. In Asia, it culminated in the creation of the Ho Chi Minh Communist regime in Vietnam and the Korean War.

Shortly thereafter, but following a year's preparatory activity, the WFDY and IUS specifically tailored this line for Latin American youth at their regional conference in Mexico City in late April 1948. At this time the struggle against "Yankee imperialists... for complete national independence" was tied to the fight for implementing the broad program of action for the political, economic and social rights of youth adopted by the Conference in order to gain the much-desired unity of Latin American youth with WFDY-IUS affiliates and to strengthen their ties and contacts with the WFDY and IUS. No longer was an appeal issued for unity-- instead a threat was used. It was made quite clear that the WFDY's program was "the one wanted by all young Latin American

patriots and democrats, and all those opposed  
to it should and must be exposed as traitors to  
(Latin American) people and enemies of  
youth. "/Underlining supplied."/

To assure the success of the conference and to strengthen WFDY's contacts in the area, a WFDY delegation (composed of reliable Communist youth leaders from the USSR, USA, France, Yugoslavia and "Republican" Spain) travelled to Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela "to study at first hand the conditions and life of youth" and "to confirm at first hand that the conditions of misery and exploitation of youth resulted from the role of U.S. imperialism in maintaining feudal conditions in agriculture, in preventing industrial development, in ... infiltrating the political and economic life of the country....," etc. The WFDY delegation contacted not only rural youth and young oil, sugar, tobacco, metal and transport workers but also students in secondary schools and universities.

The WFDY and the IUS during this period clearly exposed themselves as aggressive and revolutionary agitational and propaganda instruments of international Communism. While there was a mass disaffiliation by the disillusioned non-Communist groups from the Free World, WFDY-IUS efforts to gain a broader base of support during this period of violent revolutionary strategy did meet with a certain success in Latin America. The WFDY in particular claimed that fifty-two additional youth organizations (or over half the total number of Latin American groups now

affiliated with the WFDY) joined during the period from 1949 to 1953. The IUS claimed a total membership of 680,000 students in nineteen affiliated student organizations in fifteen Latin American countries by 1951. WFDY affiliates, in Latin America as well as elsewhere, have more of a "class" character, and are more intimately linked with the national Communist party than those belonging to the IUS.

The IUS affiliates on the other hand, directed at the intellectual elite, concentrate more energy on manipulating the non-Communist group. These bodies also serve as breeding grounds, not for the shock troops of Communist parties, but for leaders and for secret Communists.

Aware of the need to extend its influence over the non-affiliated nationally representative student unions in the Free World which constitute such an important and politically influential elite target group, the IUS began "softening" its line and modifying its tactics drastically in 1952. With its record, the IUS had to go to great lengths to disarm the suspicions of a naturally critical group. The IUS revised its constitution in 1953 to provide, for the first time, an "Associate Membership" category which purportedly permits each national student union to define in a written agreement with the IUS the authorized limits of its membership and activity. However, while such an agreement might state, for example, that the national student union

completely dissociates itself from IUS political policies and programs and limits its membership only to purportedly non-partisan and a political IUS cultural, sports and travel activities, these are mere "formalities" which matter little to the IUS. The IUS has exploited such membership to enhance its prestige and to help create the illusion of being a legitimate, representative student organization. In no instance in Latin America has an effective protest so far been made by any IUS affiliate to departures from the principles of non-partisanship even when many of their members have objected to being assaulted by a constant barrage of highly political IUS propaganda, designed to orient them against the West and towards the USSR in their natural efforts to achieve betterment of their political, economic and social conditions.

Hand-in-hand with its looser affiliation policy, the IUS has also been expanding and diversifying its program of action more and more each year since 1952 and 1953 in an effort to attract the broadest possible support and "practical cooperation" of non-member student groups on the basis of their common interests and needs, regionally, academically, culturally, athletically, socially and politically--irrespective of differing political or religious beliefs.

The success of these tactics has been significant through mid-1959. The WFDY from 1954 to the early part of 1959 also intensified activity in support of the national liberation struggle in Latin America. It is interesting

that in late 1954 the IUS sought hard to exploit a Latin American event in its anti-colonial and national liberation efforts elsewhere in the world. The IUS urged all forms of active world student solidarity with Guatemalan students in opposition to the "aggression in Guatemala", and stated it was "difficult to find a clearer case of the forcible subjugation of a state trying to assert its national independence with a programme of liberal reforms."

In other parts of Latin America IUS affiliates organized protests against the alleged "violation" of Guatemalan independence. Calls for volunteer forces were issued by the FEUE (Ecuadorian Students Federation) and the Students Association of the University of Habana.

In the case of the WFDY, its "harder" line began to unfold almost simultaneously with that of the IUS, at the WFDY Council Meeting in Peking, August 1954. WFDY President Bruno Bernini (an Italian Communist) set forth the characteristic economic themes of the Communist national liberation line:

"The present meeting of the Council... is called upon to examine... one of the most important and urgent questions of the international democratic movement, the movement of young people in the colonial and dependent countries for their rights, national independence and peace....

"The colonialists use all possible means to impede the development of the national economy, for they understand very well that the development of a national economy creates favorable conditions for the achievements of political and national independence....

"And wherever the aspirations of the people and the youth for national liberation show themselves, even the smallest, it is the American colonialists who lead the repression of this movement. Everywhere they impede the independence of the people in order to enslave them under their domination....

"No aggression or repression, however brutal...has been able to stop the liberation movement of the peoples who, on the contrary, go from victory to victory and grow stronger, extending to all countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

"Everywhere, youth and students are enthusiastically struggling in the front ranks of this powerful movement...for national independence....

"The struggle for national independence is ever more closely accompanied by more and more active work for the defense of the rights of youth and with a permanent interest on the part of the youth organizations to solve and satisfy, even on the smallest scale, the more urgent needs of youth."  
He made clear how struggle paves the way for youth into the Communist Party.

"1. The fight for the economic and social rights of the youth makes them understand better who is responsible for their situation."

WFDY President Bernini then urged WFDY affiliates to link the struggle for national independence with the struggle for the urgent needs and rights of youth from the local to the regional and international levels.

In 1955 the IUS revived its somewhat moribund Bureau of Students Fighting Against Colonialism and used it as a central coordinating point for more aggressive anti-colonial activity. At its Fourth Congress in Prague, August 1956, the IUS once again took more drastic measures to gain or retain the affiliation and unity-of-action of nationally representative student unions, most of which belonged to the non-Communist COSEC.

To remove the principal argument used by such groups against IUS affiliation--that they could not join when unrepresentative minority groups from their respective countries were already members--the IUS accepted the disaffiliation of all such unrepresentative, minority student fronts in the Free World. (These fronts, however, continue to work in support of IUS objectives either by merging into the larger body, or by retaining working ties with IUS in spite of formal disaffiliation.) It revised its constitution to provide for "Consultative" membership--the lowest possible form -- and tried to beguile the national student unions by assurances of their "autonomy". It also adopted a broader program of action and a series of resolutions concerning the line and tasks of the IUS and its affiliates in organizing united student support for national liberation movements.

The Fifth IUS Congress in Peking, September 1958, gave greatly increased importance to Latin America. In contrast to its Fourth Congress in 1956 which did not adopt any specific resolutions on Latin America, the Fifth IUS Congress adopted seven resolutions of solidarity with students in nine Latin American countries, <sup>or dependencies</sup> (Belize, British Honduras--described as "Guatemalan territory," Brazil, Cuba, Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela), as well as a separate two-page resolution on "Latin America." In this resolution the IUS Congress decided to render full support to the



struggles of Latin American student unions for "national independence and construction, against dictatorships and oppression, for the reform of education and development of their national cultures and their conditions of life and study." It also decided to render all possible material aid (scholarships, health equipment, etc.) and other assistance to Latin American student organizations, including assistance in organizing regional activities.

The Congress was also of particular importance so far as Latin America was concerned for other reasons. A larger number of Latin American countries and national student unions were represented (eighteen student organizations from sixteen countries, including twelve national student unions, three "overseas" student groups and only seven IUS affiliates). Special meetings of Latin American representatives were held during the Congress at which tactical plans were made to attempt to transfer the Third Latin American Student Conference to Venezuela from Costa Rica, presumably so that IUS assistance and participation could be rendered more easily. Finally the IUS went beyond the idea it had been trying with some success to implant in COSEC-affiliated national student unions in Latin America, i.e., that in the name of neutrality, they should belong to both the IUS and COSEC. The Congress "confirmed the view of the IUS Executive Committee that the rift in the international student movement is not so much determined by organizational adherence to the two largest groupings, IUS and ISC-COSEC, but rather

by the attitude of national student movements to the principles of peace, anti-colonialism, for national independence, the democratization of education, the improvement of study and living conditions and a better student life." Thus, the IUS seeks to emphasize its program, rather than demanding affiliation as a condition for endorsement. For the purposes of the regional effort which now is converging with those of the Peace Movement and the other fronts, formal affiliation to the IUS is irrelevant, so long as the program is consistent and the working ties--open or secret--exist.

The WFDY has since 1955 reorganized various component units of its Headquarters in Budapest in order to implement more effectively WFDY's greatly expanded and diversified program of action. This program--like that of the IUS--places increased emphasis on regional and specialized activities for young people in the same functional field, or with the same interests or problems, as the most effective way to achieve the broadest and strongest unity of action with non-member young persons and youth organizations in Latin America. It has, for example, replaced its Liaison Bureau with regional commissions. In this connection, the Latin American Commission was set up in accordance with a directive issued by the Fourth WFDY Congress in August 1957 and was ordered to pay more attention to the problems of youth in the West Indies. Its Rights of Youth Commission was expanded and upgraded to permit closer coordination with WFTU; an expanded program for young workers

was also adopted by the WFDY Congress in 1957. It also established "Permanent Commissions" for International Exchanges, Travel and Tourism, and a Children's Bureau in 1958.

The WFDY has always followed the more elite IUS for practical guidance in the line and tactics it could employ in achieving their joint unity objectives. Consequently, the WFDY in August 1957 also revised its constitution to provide for "limited" membership, a policy the WFDY had begun two years earlier. By doing so the WFDY has gained the affiliation of several organizations who have limited their membership either to the WFDY's sports program (including two in Mexico) or to its cultural or tourism activities.

Unlike the IUS, however, the WFDY affiliates have since 1957 been tightening up their relations with the national Communist parties. Some of them have been reorganized and brought directly under the Party's control as avowed young Communist bodies.

#### Tactics and Main Program of Action

The most important of the action programs being employed by the WFDY and IUS to accomplish its objectives in Latin America are:

1. Cadre Training

Both the WFDY and the IUS are making increasing efforts to build up large cadres of leaders in each specialized

field of youth and student organizational work from the local to the international level.

More Latin American "leaders" are being brought by the WFDY and the IUS to their headquarters in Budapest and Prague, respectively, not only for "on-the-job" training by working at Headquarters but also for guidance and discussions during short visits. Argentines, Brazilians, Chileans, Cubans, Mexicans and Venezuelans have undergone this experience since 1951. The Brazilian Communist youth leader Orlando Gomez Funcia worked for the WFDY since August 1955 and headed the important Latin American Commission for some time. He has recently been replaced by another Brazilian Communist youth leader, Rubem Guedes, and is free to return to Latin America to provide youth leaders in that area with more frequent and direct guidance. Another Latin American Communist WFDY headquarters official, Otto Cesar Vargas Girete, played an important role in organizing Latin American participation at the Seventh World Youth Festival (Vienna, 26 July - 4 August 1959) not only by covertly running the Latin American Section of the Permanent Commission (PC) of the International Preparatory Committee (IPC) in Vienna but also by travelling for three months in Latin America, from

January through March of 1959.

A minimum of twelve other Latin American Communists are known to have worked at IUS Headquarters for varying periods of time since 1951: one Chilean, one Colombian, three Cubans, four Ecuadorans, one Guatemalan, one Mexican, and one Venezuelan. The policy-making IUS Secretariat has usually included an Ecuadoran Communist IUS Vice President as the Latin American representative. Jorge Galarza has been serving in this capacity since 1956, when he replaced Efraim Alvarez Paredes. Although the Colombian National Union of Students (UNEC) is not affiliated with the IUS, Cesar Alonso Alvarado (a member of the UNEC Executive Committee until May 1959) is nevertheless working at IUS Headquarters in Prague as the Spanish Editor of the IUS monthly organ, World Student News. This is, of course, part of the IUS tactical effort to gain the affiliation of the Colombian National Union of Students. Alvarado began working in Prague in January 1959 when he replaced Antonio Maessip, a Cuban who had served as Spanish Editor of World Student News at IUS headquarters since mid-1957. The latter quickly returned to Cuba after the fall of the Batista regime and can be expected to become more active in the regional program.

Many of the Latin American Communists who have worked at WFDY or IUS Headquarters not only received special cadre training in party schools in the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc before returning to Latin America but on their return were also made responsible for operating the Communist party's clandestine propaganda distributing nets. Some have received special training in organizing strikes and demonstrations--important forms of political action in Latin America. All play an important role in extending Communist control over young people in this region.

Important on-the-job training is also received by the many persons working on the various local, national or international preparatory committees to organize such special WFDY-IUS events as World Youth Festivals, international conferences for working or rural youth, etc. While these committees are purportedly "broadly representative," they are in fact fronts set up and controlled by a Communist WFDY-IUS cadre. Representatives of non-affiliated organizations -- especially important non-Communist ones -- are special targets. They are given impressive titles in connection with international events, which are widely publicized as "evidence" of the representative character of the committee in question. Such persons

merely serve as important figureheads and have no real authority. They are usually relatively inexperienced in organizing such events and only too happy to accept the advice, guidance or direction of more experienced fellow committee members who are not known to be Communists. This was true in the case of the Permanent Commission of the International Preparatory Committee for the Seventh World Youth Festival, where some eleven Latin Americans -- four Argentinians, three Brazilians, three Chileans and one Uruguayan -- worked for the PC in Vienna for varying periods of time. While six belonged to organizations not affiliated with WFDY-IUS, they did not appear to have had prior experience in organizing mass events and were more susceptible to "suggestions" by the more experienced WFDY-IUS cadre on the PC. Also, the six who appear to be in fact non-Communists have welcomed WFDY-IUS support of their national and regional problems. No effort is made in such cases to convert these people to Communism or to use them for subversive purposes while working on such committees. They are of more value as disinterested advocates of continued cooperation with WFDY and IUS in the future.

More formal cadre training was envisaged by the WFDY at its Fourth Congress in August 1957, when it adopted resolutions calling for the creation of large WFDY cadres of functional youth leader specialists by training them in (a) formal one-to-three month training courses on "agronomy and mechanization of agriculture,"

and (c) youth-leader training seminars for each branch of sport, for young workers by trade, for peasant girls by region, etc. Latin Americans who were, or had the potential of becoming, energetic and trusted youth leaders in their specialized field and areas were to be selected for such cadre training on WFDY Scholarships. Although the WFDY has begun to implement this program, it has not yet done so in entirety. For example, there have been no reports that the WFDY has actually started its one-to-three month formal training of rural youth leaders on "legislation and mechanization of agriculture." It is however expected that hereafter even more emphasis will be given to training rural and working youth cadres, as a result of decisions taken by the WFDY at its Assembly of Member Organizations in Prague, August 1959. Such an effort was endorsed by the WFTU at its World Conference of Young Workers (Prague, 14-20 July 1958). The converging WFDY-WFTU interest in young workers as an important target group is directly designed to strengthen national Communist parties for the second phase of the national liberation struggle. The eight-member Organizing Committee of the WFTU Conference in July 1958 included representatives of both WFTU and WFDY affiliates, and in 1958-1959 the WFTU actively supported the Seventh World Youth Festival both financially and organizationally. WFTU leaders also took an active part in the sixteen important meetings for young workers in the same profession or occupation held during the recent Festival.



Although not to be regarded in the category of cadre training, mention should also be made of the scholarships awarded by the IUS and IUS affiliates for undergraduate and graduate study at Sino-Soviet bloc universities. Such scholarships are primarily intended not only to help enhance the prestige of the IUS and extend its influence over student groups in Asia, Africa and Latin America but also, to help build reserves of future leaders oriented toward the Soviet Union. That they are serving a useful function is evident from the increased number of scholarships the IUS claims to have awarded since 1953: 60 in 1954, 152 during 1957-1958 and "approximately the same number during the coming year." IUS scholarships were awarded to Ecuadorian and Haitian students by the IUS in 1958.

The WFDY also started similar scholarship awards in 1953 but of the thirty WFDY scholarships awarded last year, none went to Latin American students.

## 2. Festivals and other Activities

Probably the most important of all WFDY-IUS tactics in their appeals to non-Communist youth are the World Youth Festivals -- co-sponsored every other year by the WFDY and the IUS. The Festivals -- with their great variety of events not only for regional youth and students but also for young workers, students and young professional adults in each different specialized field and according

to their differing avocations and hobbies -- are, in effect, vehicles for virtually the entire WFDY-IUS action program, not only at the Festival itself, but throughout the world.

They serve to portray the Soviet Union and the WFDY-IUS as ardent "champions" of peace, of nations struggling to retain or gain their independence, and of young people struggling for social, economic and political betterment. They serve to strengthen the WFDY-IUS organizationally by stimulating widespread interest in and support for local and national Festival preparatory and "report-back" activities, as well as large-scale Free World participation at the Festivals.

In view of the fact that the WFDY-IUS' re-intensified drive to mobilize Latin American youth in support of the national liberation movement began in 1954, it is appropriate to review briefly World Youth Festivals held since then. Some 1,000 young people from twenty Latin American Republics are reported to have attended the Fifth World Youth Festival in Warsaw, August 1955 -- over three times as many as attended the Third Festival in 1951 in East Berlin. 1,008 youths from Latin America attended the Sixth Festival in Moscow in 1957 -- constituting 3% of the total number of participants. While the sponsors have not yet reported the number of Latin Americans who actually attended their Seventh World Youth Festival, which was recently held in Vienna in August 1959, they

allowed places for some 1,380 young people from Latin American countries to attend--since the Festival was only half as large as the Moscow one Latin American proportionate participation increased substantially.

A measure of the size and importance of this effort for the Communist cause is the fact that some \$932,000 was expended for Latin American delegates' travel to the Sixth Festival, of which only \$60,000 was contributed from Latin America. The Seventh Festival costs were even greater.

E. Communist Lawyers Organizations and the National Liberation Strategy in Latin America

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) has long held a unique position among Communist international fronts. Its gatherings are small and not widely publicized, but, composed as it is of members of the legal profession and jurists, it offers a particularly useful instrument for organizing and supporting Communist campaigns designed to exploit Free World legal traditions and concepts. Its local contacts with the Communist party are usually limited, except in connection with legal defense of Communists and their allies before the courts. It includes among its members many of the most skillful and well known personalities long associated with international Communist fronts, and has been particularly useful in agitation over civil rights matters and questions of international law. Its seminars, activities and publications

on the latter questions have, in countries of Latin America, as well as in the more advanced nations of Asia and Africa, had greatest effect when the national liberation strategy was operating, for its members often have, because of their professional education and status, personal relationships with influential figures and the politically ambitious, including many on the conservative right.

The increase of IADL influence and importance in the "colonial" countries (including Latin America) in 1952 was hailed as a favorable development by Joe Nordmann, the Secretary General, at the Council session in Vienna in 1952. There was a disproportionately large number of articles on "colonial countries" in the IADL Review, among them one on the Charter of Guatemala. Like the WFDY, the IADL organized regional efforts early. The First Continental Congress of Jurists took place in 1952 in Rio de Janeiro where the center of IADL Latin American activities is still reportedly located. This Latin American capital appears to be the one in which the organization's local leadership enjoys the greatest prestige and freedom of action.

An extensive list of Latin American jurists was publicized as attending this congress. Some of them did not in fact attend; others are believed not to have consented to the use of their names.

The Second Continental Congress of Jurists was held in Guatemala in October 1953; the costs were largely borne out of Government funds on the instructions of President Arbenz.

The resolutions of this Congress are of great interest, for they clearly show the lines of the national liberation strategy. They dealt with self-determination; condemnation of British intervention in Guiana politics; the rights of the Puerto Rican people; the rights of Panamanian people over the Canal Zone; illegal British occupation of Belize; the need to amend the Charter of the UN; a resolution against regional agreements and organizations (OAS) and a resolution on democratic freedoms. Messages of sympathy were directed to various "persecuted" individuals. It is typical that these messages sought to place in this category of the "persecuted" both a defense attorney for Soviet intelligence agents and a Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. An effort was made, unsuccessfully, to create a Continental Lawyers Association.

There is a close connection between the IADL, its national affiliates, and certain of the national Associations (or leagues) for Rights of Man in Latin America. Some meetings organized through such national organizations have also reflected the national liberation strategy. A Congress of Magistrates held in Brazil in 1955 protested the export of manganese to the U.S. from the Amapa Territory, declaring it "disgraceful and illegal". The First Congress for the Defense of Amazonia was sponsored by the League for National Liberation, whose leaders included a number of persons active in the IADL.

The major regional efforts began in 1955. A Latin American Congress for Civil Liberties was sponsored in Santiago, Chile in August 1955 by a number of Latin American IADL figures. Announced as a gathering of the parliamentarians of Latin America, it was attended mainly by pro-Communist and Communist personalities. This congress planned a second one to be held in Buenos Aires in late 1956. During 1957 the energies of the IADL affiliates were concentrated on activities within their respective countries, but as of early 1958, they anticipated renewed opposition to Communist initiatives and resumed their regional agitational work on the civil rights issue. The intensification of Communist party activity which had been decided upon in November 1957 in Moscow certainly had its effect upon this decision.

A Latin American Congress of Democratic Solidarity, held in Buenos Aires in July 1958, was promoted by the Argentine League for the Rights of Man, but foreign delegations were in the main organized by national IADL branches and individual IADL contacts. At this meeting collaboration with Communist-dominated trade unions was also a comparatively new feature of this effort. A report was presented on the rights of individuals in Latin America and on the problems connected with discrimination and persecution for political or trade union reasons. It was decided to intensify the battle for abolition of repressive legislation and to set up a Committee whose task will be to organize the first Congress of Democratic Solidarity which will be held in Brazil in October 1959. Their concern was

justified, for the Argentine organization which sponsored the 1958 Democratic Solidarity Congress has itself been dissolved by the Government as a Communist front organization. The outbreak of widespread strike activity during the past year has also created work for the IADL and its affiliates and, probably, will provide a central issue for the October 1959 Congress.

The IADL has a long record of close and effective cooperation with the World Peace Council, and many persons are active at the same time in both groups. Its efforts also tie in closely with those of the Soviet bloc governments and official delegations, whose appeals for trade, cultural contacts, and "understanding" are directed consciously to the same groups of prominent personalities which the IADL has sought to influence. The organization's efforts in these fields continue, but it can now be expected to concentrate more on spreading the ideas that are being advanced by the Peace movement.

F. International Communist Activity Among Journalists in Support of the National Liberation Strategy in Latin America

The extent of local Communist propaganda activity in Latin America may be gauged by the fact that there are some 250 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and periodicals produced in Latin America. These include publications of local Communist parties, front groups and locally produced editions of inter-

national front periodicals. But Communist journalists in Latin America have, particularly since 1956, been encouraged and assisted in broadening their influence by the Communist-front International Organization of Journalists (IOJ).

Evidence of specific interest on the part of the IOJ in the tasks of organizing, directing and controlling the activities of journalists and newspapermen in Latin America was apparent at the Third World Conference of the IOJ held in Helsinki in May 1956. Included in the delegates attending this meeting were thirty-eight individuals from Brazil, nine from Mexico, three from Chile, two from Peru and one from Uruguay.

Subsequent to the Helsinki Conference organizations of journalists in Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela became affiliated with the IOJ. The Brazilian Press Association signed an agreement calling for cooperation with the IOJ at the Seventh National Congress of Brazilian Journalists held 7-14 September 1957 in Rio de Janeiro. The Fourth National Congress of the Federation of Journalists of Peru held during October 1957 adopted a resolution favoring the maintenance of relations with both the IOJ and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the Free World equivalent of the IOJ.

The Mexican section of the IOJ, which is called the Circulo de Periodistas, was admitted to membership at the Fourth Congress of the IOJ in May 1956. Renato Leduc of Mexico was



elected Vice President of the IOJ at this meeting.

The action of the Peruvian group is particularly interesting, as an illustration of a tactical step taken in order to gain maximum support at the national level for a Communist policy. The IOJ has frequently and unsuccessfully tried to win acceptance and some agreement for common action from the IFJ since 1954. The campaign begun in 1956 to create new national organizations or gain influence in existing Latin American journalist groups is in part an outgrowth of that failure. For, by developing simultaneous relationships with both groups, Communist journalists seek to exploit the national association as a means of exerting pressure for unity from below on the IFJ. When this effort is combined (as it is) with a program designed to unite Latin American journalists into a regional group, the combination of Communist cadres in the journalistic profession operating at the national level and the existence of regional issues generated in the national liberation campaigns provide a very useful basis for exerting pressure. Whether the policies of the IFJ are effected is of secondary importance. For, should the Latin American regional body be led to believe that its just demands are being ignored, mishandled, or countered by IFJ policies, the IOJ is always ready and willing to sympathize with and thereafter absorb it. There is an alternative tactic which Communists employ in such a situation, particularly where

their own followers are few and where consciously nationalist elements have already rejected the idea of any international affiliation. In this case, the Communist tactic is to make virtue of necessity, favor only the regional association, and use their willingness to drop the idea of IOJ ties as "proof" that they are patriotic nationalists entitled to acceptance. This device has been used extensively as a means of gaining influence at the regional level in the student field in Latin America during the past three years. It also is employed by virtually all the front groups in Africa and the Middle East.

The attempt to convoke a Latin American Congress of Journalists began in October 1957, with resolutions adopted by the Fourth National Congress of the Federation of Journalists of Peru and by the Eighth National Convention of the Mexican National Syndicate of Newspapermen. Both of these meetings were attended by individuals who had been delegates to the IOJ 1956 meeting in Helsinki.

In January 1958 a group of journalists known to have participated in IOJ activities gathered in Mexico City to draft an appeal to the national associations of journalists in Latin America and to journalists in general. The associations were called upon

- (1) to strengthen their bonds and mutual relations on the basis of the defense

of the freedom of the press, of the right to free access to sources of information and of the defense of the professional interests of all journalists;

- (2) to strengthen bonds of friendship and solidarity between American journalists and journalists of other parts of the world;
- (3) to meet together to study these problems from a broad platform in order to find an organic solution to them.

The appeal was signed by journalists from Brazil, Cuba, Peru, Mexico, Colombia and Ecuador.

In April 1958 a party of Soviet journalists arrived in Argentina, ostensibly to cover the inauguration of President Frondizi. Their trip extended into May, and involved visits to Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and Panama. Their known contacts with Communist writers and journalists along the way provided opportunities for encouraging and guiding coordinated action on a regional basis, in response to the January initiative.

Communist region-wide programs are often slow to give conclusive results, but in the meantime gains can be won at the national level.

For example, in the same month (October 1958) when the head of the International Organization of Journalists and its Mexican vice-president, Renato Ledesma, were guests and speakers at the

Venezuelan Press Congress, the School of Journalism of the Central University in Caracas selected a model newspaper to be used in the study of format by journalism students. The paper selected was L'Humanite, the official daily of the French Communist Party, one of the "best" Communist propaganda organs in the Free World.

An official agreement for cooperation with the IOJ was also adopted at the October Congress in Caracas.

Additional Soviet bloc news agencies -- including those of Czechoslovakia and Communist China -- as of the latter months of 1958 had begun establishing themselves in Latin America. The Czechoslovaks are established in Argentina, and the Chinese are reporting setting up in Cuba. Both seek other new outlets. Renato Leduc, speaking at Caracas, sought to help this effort along by a diatribe attacking the "inaccuracy" of existing news services in Latin America. It is not unlikely that an "accurate" and native Latin American news service may suddenly appear, perhaps under the aegis of Renato Leduc. The Prensa Latina service recently established in Cuba may prove to be just such a vehicle.

IV

The Policies and Programs of the Communist Parties of Latin America.

In 1954, the Communist party was illegal in fifteen of the twenty Latin American republics. In some of these countries, notably Brazil and Chile, the party had by adjusting successfully to the changes of 1952 continued to maintain a sizeable membership and to exert some political influence. In others, as in Cuba, the party was well organized on a national scale; or consisted of a small but well-indoctrinated nucleus, as in Costa Rica. In a number of countries, the principal leaders had been forced into exile, from whence they continued to maintain clandestine liaison with underground elements in their native countries. Of the five countries where the party was legal, in only one (Argentina) did it have the extensive organization required of a mass party; but in none of these countries did it have significant political influence. Nowhere, save in Chile, was the party accepted as part of a nationally organized political coalition.

Regardless of their status, the Communist parties in all the larger countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico) were able to publish newspapers, theoretical organs, and propaganda of various types, and in most countries Communist front organizations of one kind or another were active and able to disseminate, if not produce, propaganda material. In the smaller countries, however, or in those where the party was rigidly suppressed, the parties were unprepared or unable to publish a regular party organ or even irregular, mimeographed, indoctrination and news sheets. Soviet bloc publications were easily available from overt outlets in Mexico, Brazil,

and Uruguay; through associated bookstores in some countries, and through centers for "cultural exchange" which existed in all the major countries. However, in the smaller countries outlets had not been established and in some cases Communist materials were obtainable from abroad only through inefficient clandestine channels. In virtually all countries, some type of Communist propaganda activity, such as that carried on by the "Peace Partisans", was possible.

The revival of the "national liberation front" strategy in Latin America has developed gradually under CPSU direction. In preparation for the new strategy it was necessary to rehabilitate and strengthen the organization of the various Latin American CP's. After the Twentieth CPSU Congress of 1952, the Latin American parties (most of which had, like the CPSU itself, long neglected to hold party congresses or conventions) began to revise their statutes to bring them into line with those of the CPSU, to prepare official party programs, and to schedule party congresses for the purpose of confirming the statutes and revised programs.

The tasks of the party during the first, "bourgeois democratic" phase of the strategy are of utmost importance, but of a very unspectacular nature. Its intelligence function, of continuously studying the political and economic structure and situation for the benefit of the entire international movement, becomes of great importance. Its training function, to convince party members of the usefulness and orthodoxy of the strategy and to instruct them in the duties which fall upon them, is also a major task. Since the strategy is regional in scope, the task of coordination with other Latin American

parties assumes new dimensions. As the individual programs in each field of front activity unfold, the task of mobilizing all party assets to advance the cause of greatest tactical importance at the moment becomes more complex and demanding.

From the beginning of the first phase, the party leaderships also must bear in mind the need to prepare for the more aggressive, difficult and hazardous second phase of "building a socialist society". To this end they must continuously emphasize recruitment of new members--both open and secret, and systematic infiltration of governments, the armed forces, the economy, and politically significant organizations with party agents who can provide information, protection, material support, and camouflaged influence in difficult or critical situations.

#### The Intelligence Function

Since 1954, ever increasing emphasis has been placed on this work. It is important to note that this is not conventional espionage in most cases, but a more or less systematic study of facts for the party's use. It may range from a casual noting of the most common local complaints through comparatively elaborate studies of national economic facts such as were made available to the WFTU in 1956. In recent months several Latin American parties have produced, in one form or another, interesting and detailed analyses of the many elements in the national bourgeoisie of their countries. The common use of special terminology, the organization of the reports, and the conclusions reached strongly suggest that they are based upon a guide or outline which was made available to the parties recently. It is known that the parties have

been asked in 1950 to produce specific reports and papers for the benefit of the international journal Problems of Peace and Socialism in Prague. The Arismendi articles mentioned earlier in this report are good illustrations of the product of this work.

#### The Coordination Function

At the Twentieth CPSU Congress, a special conference of all Latin American CP delegates was held in Moscow to discuss the use of certain parties and party congresses as channels for the exchange of information, to coordinate action against the "common enemy," and to plan an "anti-imperialist" campaign in which the Communist role would be concealed. Similar conferences of Latin American CP leaders were held, under Soviet auspices, in November 1957 in Moscow where eighteen parties were represented and in early 1959 in Moscow, on the occasion of the Twenty-first CPSU Congress, where eighteen parties were represented.

One significant demonstration of this program being carried out involves the theoretical journal of the Argentine Communist Party, Nueva Era. In April 1959 Problems of Peace and Socialism printed a three-page article describing and praising the journal for its work during the past ten years. By pointing out how well the journal was dealing with such important party problems as "countering the clerical offensive," "criticizing revisionist tendencies," "making democratic traditions serve the working class," "combatting bourgeois ideology," "Peronism, and imperialist economic encroachments," the editorial board in Prague has obviously recommended the publication for study by other Latin American parties. Since it praises the work of Ernesto Guidice for its



"opposition to the clerical offensive," we too may find study of this material informative and useful.

#### The Mobilization Function

The Brazilian CP program, adopted by the Fourth Congress of that party in November 1954, first outlined the need for a "popular democratic government of national liberation," a "coalition of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces." It also called for "winning over" or at least neutralizing, the rich and middle-class landowners while confiscating or nationalizing the property only of those capitalists who are linked with "United States imperialism".

The Brazilian CP program was widely disseminated to other Communist parties in Latin America as an example to be studied in the preparation of their own programs. Thus, in a programmatic document presented to the Central Committee of the CP Paraguay, in November 1955, Oscar Croydt paid tribute to the guidance supplied by the Brazilian party and the Soviet CP. Moreover, Croydt also paid tribute to the Chinese, whose "victorious agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution poses to the working class of the colonial and dependent countries...the necessity of revising their old programmatic concepts." In addition, Croydt cited the program of the CP's of Great Britain and Viet Nam, in both of which certain concessions were made in an effort to "neutralize" or "win over" bourgeois elements which otherwise might be hostile. For example, he noted that the CP Viet Nam exempted from expropriation the large landowners who did not cooperate with the French imperialists because, at the time the program was formulated, the central task was the war of national liberation. Croydt

then called for an intensive study of Paraguayan conditions in order to determine the stage of social development as a guide to the formulation of a Paraguayan Communist Party program.

After their return from the Twentieth CPSU Congress and the Eighth CP China Congress in 1956, Latin American party leaders began with renewed vigor, to reorient the programs and the tactics of their parties in terms of the national liberation front. As the earlier sections of this report abundantly reveal, a parallel effort was undertaken by the leaders of Communist fronts, many of whom had also been to Russia and China and had attended international front congresses where special aspects of the united front strategy were outlined to them.

The programs of the Latin American CP's, of which the Cuban Party program provides the best current example, are formulated according to a common pattern.

First, an analysis of the history and current situation of the country is prepared by selected high party leaders, in close association with the CPSU theoreticians. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the "stage of development" toward Socialism in the country concerned, and to identify and isolate the "principal enemy" which impedes the course of the revolution at this time. The result of this analysis is a foregone conclusion: the Latin American country concerned is found to harbor vestiges of feudalism, to show some capitalist development, to have a semi-colonial status, and to have one principal enemy (United States "imperialism"). It may be noted, parenthetically, that the great contribution of the

Chinese revolution is said to be that it revealed a course of development from semi-feudal and semi-colonial status leading directly toward socialism, without a capitalist stage.

Secondly, an analysis of the class structure of the society is made, following the general type of analysis made by the Chinese Communists. The results of this are again stereotyped, and the various classes fall into two main categories: those identifiable with foreign (US) imperialism, and therefore "enemies;" and those not so identified, which (to varying degrees) are opposed to the enemy group and who may, therefore, be "neutralized" or drawn into a united anti-imperialist movement.

Thirdly, a program analyzes the existing political parties, classifying them according to their degree of identification with the various classes and class interests. Those most easily penetrated or with which alliances may be formed may be identified to party members, in inner party study documents, but such explicit identification appears to be excluded from published programs. The Communist party itself is obviously invariably identified as "the party which most accurately represents the aspirations of the working class, and of the general welfare."

Fourthly, a program cites the need for a united, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal front of national liberation. It is emphasized that this is not just a united political front opposed to the regime in power, but a united anti-imperialist front (i. e., one directed against the United States) and the Communist party is the only party which is prepared to give proper direction to the front (i. e., to maintain its anti-US, or at least

neutralist, orientation, and to influence it in the direction of Marxist-Leninist ideology).

Finally, the program may analyze the immediate political situation and suggest the immediate tasks of the party (agitation for wage raises, protests against political persecution, etc.--whatever current issues provide the basis for developing united action or inspiring nationalist, anti-imperialist action on the part of non-Communist elements). This part of the program is supplemented, from time to time, by manifestos, theses, and policy statements which serve to give guidance on current issues.

While being formulated, the analyses and draft studies are circulated for study and discussion among party members, although such discussion does not alter the basic nature of the document. Rather, it serves to educate the membership and to ensure unanimous approval of the program when a party congress is finally convened. These study documents are frequently of a naive and unrealistic nature, but they are often more explicit than the program as eventually published for general circulation. For example, the "thesis" of the Cuban CP circulated for study in May 1956 contains the following outline of the strategy of the party.

#### Strategy of the Party; the Question of Alliances.

1. The strategy of the Party should be oriented in terms as follows:

- a. objective: expulsion of imperialism and destruction of feudal latifundism

- b. direction of principal blow: against the bloc of latifundists and bourgeoisie who are committed to imperialism
- c. principal force: the workers and peasants, under the direction of the workers
- d. allies or reserves: the petty bourgeoisie
- e. additional reserves: the existence of the USSR and the entire Socialist world, the proletariat of the United States and Latin America, international solidarity, and, in some cases, disagreements between U. S. and Cuban sugar magnates or among imperialists themselves
- f. distribution of forces: among the groups defined as the National Democratic Front.

2. In all this strategy, the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class plays an extremely important role. This alliance is essential; without it, the revolution can make no headway and therefore the task of forming it must occupy the most important place in our activity.

Despite the emphasis placed on the need for each Communist party to develop its own tactics in terms of its own national situation, there is a marked similarity and lack of originality in the central themes adopted by all the Latin American Communist parties.

### The Recruitment Function

While recruitment has been much talked of by the Latin American parties since 1954, the greatest gains have been made in Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Cuba. These countries, with Brazil, contain some 90 % of the total Latin American Communist party membership. Recruiting campaigns take place from time to time, among the persons who have been brought into close association with the party in its unity work. The following statements drawn from party recruiting instructions reveal the methods and peculiarities of recruitment work:

"The Party should never cease recruiting, even in the most difficult times. In some cases recruiting is facilitated when the Party has legal status and rapid growth is realized.... Recruiting is entering a new phase in which the Party cannot count on legality, but, at the same time, it is not faced with the adverse conditions it was confronted with in earlier times.... Present conditions are not favorable for massive recruitment, ... but they do permit a development and strengthening of the Party with the most capable people from the worker, peasant, and middle-class groups....

"If the Party only knew how to attract them, there are capable people who were not disposed to join when the Party was legal, but who would be disposed to join now that the Party is illegal and fighting under difficult conditions.

"Recruitment is carried out in a disorganized manner without making proper use of agitation, propaganda, and political education. The Party has been careless about this task and has recruited whenever it considered opportune to recruit without utilizing the best methods and taking more advantage of personal friendships. Not one sound, organized, planned recruitment has been made. Instead, recruiting has been done in an improvised, haphazard form.

"At the present time persons from the lower middle class... predominate in the Party.... This composition must be changed.... The participation of the working class in the party is a guarantee of revolutionary firmness and vigor. In general, the ranks of the Party must be swelled with people from the working class, but opportunities to recruit more members from the lower middle class should not be passed up.

"In the development and strengthening of the Communist youth organization.... it is necessary to examine each candidate, his age, personal characteristics, social situation, etc., for undoubtedly some will be better placed if assigned to the youth movement.

"In recruiting, the Party must not look only for those who are perfect as members.... It is necessary to explain to persons whom you are trying to recruit that one's religious beliefs, regardless of whether it is Catholic or Evangelist, will not prevent his joining

the Party. Each will learn through his study of Marxism after entering the Party what religion is and the role it plays, and he will adopt a scientific attitude. In talking to a potential recruit, the recruiter should note the prospective recruit's difficulties, his points of view, his objections, etc., so that proper answers and arguments to wear him down can be formulated.

"....Certain establishments have been assigned as targets to penetrate; ... effect: if the Party should do the following:

a. Each cell should select a shop, plant, farm, or other suitable target to penetrate.

b. Members of the cell will then participate in the labor, cultural, or other organizations in that target, cultivating friends who later can be converted into candidates for membership.

c. After it is known what the problems of the workers in that target are, what their wants are, etc., the Party will make plans to bring them about. The most important demands might be the organization of a labor union, establishment of schedules, lighting, better sanitation facilities, raise in salaries, etc.

d. Propaganda and agitation will be used in the target to the extent possible,



dividing such propaganda as follows: general Party propaganda given to the workers at the end of the day or as they leave the plant; propaganda dealing exclusively with recruitment; and propaganda specifically directed at bringing about the demands of the workers.

"All future members should first be candidates for two months and take part in a study circle before being admitted to the Party.... Each cell should try to organize its own study circle of candidates, and each circle should be a permanent organization, in the sense that once its candidates go on to the Party as members, it should look for new candidates and thus keep the continuous movement of new members for the Party going.

"Not more than two members of the cell should be designated to supervise the circle and they should maintain good security when talking about the circle with other members of the cell, observing the norms of clandestine work."

#### The Training Function

Domestic training programs were established as early as 1954, in some instances with sets of training documents supplied by the CPSU. In preparation for the development of the new party programs, emphasis in training was first placed on fundamental Communist theory--on the Marxist-Leninist "science" of laws of social development which "permit the understanding,

not only of what is happening today, but also what will occur tomorrow; which permit scientific foreknowledge of the march of events, the direction in which these must develop, and which permit action to be taken, therefore, in an advantageous and precise manner." (Konstantinov, El Materialismo Historico El Crijalbo, Mexico, 1957, p. 24)

This belief in Marxist-Leninist "science" and the inevitability of Socialism and Communism was essential as a means of justifying to many Communists-- who had been accustomed to confronting only "enemies"--collaboration with the nationalist bourgeoisie and other "anti-imperialist" forces in a national liberation front. The need for such collaboration was indicated in a paper presented at the Twelfth Congress of the Mexican CP, in September 1954, which quoted Stalin's statement that "in the semi-colonial and dependant countries, at a certain stage and for a determined period, the national bourgeoisie can help the revolutionary movement."

In 1954-1955, trusted party members went abroad for training in trade union activity. Since that time, regional trade union training courses have been organized in Latin America itself, and other potential trade union leaders in party ranks have been sent as far as China for training in the tactics of revolutionary trade unionism and of exploiting this effort in the interests of the party. It is also significant that one of the main efforts of the new international journal published in Prague is to provide parties in the Free World with material useful in training party members. Special articles on trade union tactics--particularly on the tactics of the limited strike, and on methods of linking trade union questions with the peace and

national liberation struggle, have been written by Italian Communist trade unionists who have had extensive experience--and some success--with those tactics.

Intensification of training was called for in November 1957, and a major project was undertaken secretly early in 1958 by the Argentine Party. This project, a secret regional training school, was, however, uncovered and closed by Argentine authorities in September 1958. While official party schools and party-sponsored Labor Universities have been active in countries where the party operates legally, the training program needed to equip party members for the second phase of the national liberation strategy has encountered difficulties. New methods are being developed to overcome these difficulties and to maintain the secrecy which is so essential.

#### The Infiltration Function

As early as 1955 Communist parties began their efforts to recruit secret members in the so-called "bourgeois" parties of Latin America. There is unfortunately no way in which we can determine where specifically they have succeeded in their efforts, but we have evidence, in a number of instances, that the parties themselves--and the international leadership as well--have been dissatisfied with the results attained. Numbers alone are not significant in this field, however. The contrast between the experiences of Cuba and Venezuela in the past year are enlightening. In Cuba the revolutionary armed forces and the newly formed police have, according to one Communist leader, been so penetrated that "no repression of Communist activity is possible." Penetration of the

Ministry of Education is also extensive, and as a result the popularization of the idea that anti-Communism is equivalent to pro-Americanism and counterrevolutionary tendencies has been facilitated. The organization for carrying out agrarian reform is at present another prime target for infiltration. In Venezuela, too, a major effort has been made to infiltrate the educational field and some of the effects are noted elsewhere in this report. What is most difficult to assess is the extent to which the willingness of non-Communist organizations to maintain joint programs of action with avowed Communist and pro-Communist bodies is made possible by the advice, interpretations of events, and technical work done by well-placed individual party members. There is, however, evidence of very recent date to show that in the field of regional student activity, a mere handful of well-placed individual Communists has managed to exert appreciable influence on the actions of otherwise reputable and representative national unions of students. The well-documented proof of the influence personally exerted by Jose Manuel Fortuny within the Guatemalan government prior to its fall in 1954 is a case worthy of careful study.

As of late 1953, another tactic of infiltration has been adopted--the creation of "front" parties. These artificial parties built around a covert Communist nucleus are extremely useful instruments in political alliances. Even though they may be mere splinter groups, they can be used for political maneuvering, and in parliamentary bodies Communists elected to office with their support can provide the party at a critical moment with the additional few votes that may decide an issue. In this light, the vigorous opposition of the Cuban Communists to the provision of the

present electoral law requiring a party to enroll 5% of the electorate before it receives official recognition is significant.

A caveat is most necessary here. There is no doubt whatever that the infiltration program has and is being energetically pursued, and alertness and use of all critical facilities is essential for our protection. But it is imperative that we exercise self-restraint and care in judging individuals. Latin American Communists have recently acknowledged that their mistrust and fear of enemies of the party has seriously impeded their growth. We too must realize that an emotional preoccupation with and over-estimation of the capabilities of the Communists in this field can only hamper our efforts. To the extent that our people become critical and informed, the political usefulness of such individuals is reduced. And chasing spies is the task of governments.

#### The Main Current Programs of Action

As of mid-1959, the Latin American party programs of action appear to center in three efforts:

- a. campaigns of strike action
- b. campaign for radical land reform
- c. a broad but so far largely covert campaign for regional solidarity against foreign economic and military ties.

The strike program is being pushed with particular vigor against governments and ruling parties, where these resolutely oppose or reject

Communist proposals and demands. They are directed against foreign-owned enterprise where the party is legal and governmental policies permit such struggles to be portrayed as patriotic endeavors. In those few cases where governments are committed to a radical anti-imperialist position, strike action takes the frankly political form of "solidarity demonstrations" and "manifestations of the strength and unity of the masses" reminiscent of the mass mobilizations which so frequently are organized in Soviet bloc countries.

Land reform agitation also takes three forms. In countries where radical land reform has been declared a national policy, Communist agitation is directed mainly toward winning credit for the program and demanding that the party be given a major role in carrying it out, through the use of such slogans as "democratization of the administration of land reform." In other cases where less radical programs are instituted, party agitation either demands a more radical program, or condemns the program outright as being designed to promote the growth of a rural bourgeoisie. Where no land reform is in progress or proposed, the agitation takes on violent forms, with the party encouraging peasants to seize lands by force.

The third program, designed to have the broadest possible impact, is the one on which most care and top-level Communist attention is being lavished. It is the peace and national independence program, in which the projected Latin American People's Congress plays a central role. The most important precondition for the gathering--the procuring of an initiative by prominent and obviously non-Communist public figures--has apparently not been achieved so far. A proposal for "a broad gathering of representatives

of all sectors of Latin American society' has recently been made by the Cuban Minister of Education, Armando Hart, but if this proves to be the long sought initiative, it falls far short of the quality and character of sponsorship desired. Much work is being done currently by the Peace Partisans and other fronts at the national level which could rapidly be mobilized in support of a proper initiative.

## V. The Prospects

Between 1954 and 1958 the International Communist Movement made substantial gains in Latin America. The party now has legal status, or at least de facto legality, in nine countries, including Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, and Venezuela. Exiled Communists, many fortified through training in the Soviet bloc or other countries, have returned to reorganize parties and fronts in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Peru, and Paraguay, where the parties remain illegal. In countries where stringent repression has existed, as in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, improved coordination between exiled and underground leaders has been developed and aid obtained from Communist parties in neighboring countries.

In general, the CP's have increased their membership.

In recent months there have been some significant setbacks. In Argentina virtually all the front organizations have been forced to dissolve or suspend operations. In Venezuela, the Communist Party has been excluded from the governing coalition and has apparently been checked in its efforts to infiltrate governmental and military bodies. In Cuba the Party has been proved incapable of gaining a dominant position in labor without outside help, and opposition to further extension of its influence is real and growing. Certain Socialist groups which had been willing to cooperate with the Communists between 1955 and 1957 have during 1958 and early 1959 put up increasing resistance. Persistent criticism of revisionism during 1958 and 1959 suggests that, in certain countries



at least, there is opposition even within the party ranks to the reassertion of the old fundamental values of seizure of power and the need to prepare for violent struggle.

The current policies and activities of the International Communist Movement in Latin America reveal three primary trends:

- a. a "radicalized," increasingly revolutionary and aggressive trend in trade union, peasant, and youth work, with ever-increasing inter-relationships at the national and regional level between heretofore separate campaigns,
- b. a less partisan, more flexible, and ever-broadening trend in the campaigns directed in the main at the groups and forces which are characterized as the "national bourgeoisie",
- c. an intensified drive by the Communist parties to gain effective control of worker, peasant and youth masses.

While these trends may at first glance appear mutually contradictory, the role of each in the general strategy is such that, in any given country, some benefit can be derived by the Movement from even a partial success.

To the extent that the peace and independence campaigns succeed, the unity and resistance of the Free World to Communist subversion and threat is undermined, even when governments remain firmly in conservative hands.

Where the peace campaigns fail to affect the foreign policies of governments, the radicalized campaigns conducted in the name of national liberation can easily be diverted--as they were in 1948-51--into revolutionary, violent attacks upon the national government.

Where both of these campaigns succeed, the hard core of the Communist party, increased in strength, can move forward to carry out the "transition to socialism".

Where both fail, the strengthened hard core of the party can, even under attack, revert to its minimal role: that of a conspiratorial corps of agents at the disposition of the international movement.

But the most important fact, that must be faced squarely, is that only the Communists and a small handful of students of the Communist movement are aware of the interrelations between the various programs and of the contradictions between them. It is on this ignorance, lack of interest, and the preoccupation of non-Communists with their personal and parochial interests more than on anything else that the Communist chances of ultimate success depend.

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VI For Oral Presentation - Confidential Supplement.

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Development of the International General Strategy--  
Its Effect upon International Coordination and Control  
Methods

Since 1954-1955, the International Communist movement has tried to take into account, in its efforts to appeal to national interests and forces, the fact that the historical experience of the COMINFERN and COMINFORM has frequently been used with considerable effect to attack Communist parties as instruments of an international conspiracy. It has therefore tried, during 1954-1959, to modify and conceal the system of international coordination and control.

Both the dissolution of the COMINFERN in 1943 and of the COMINFORM in April 1956 took place at moments when the general strategy of the movement was focused on an appeal to nationalisms. The suspension of the COMINFORM journal, For a Lasting Peace, for a Peoples Democracy, in connection with the current campaign proved, however, to be a serious blow to effective coordination and control of day-to-day party activities. This was made particularly clear by the confusion created in Communist parties in 1956 after Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Party Congress was given broad publicity.

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The most important method of Soviet strategic guidance of Free World Communists involves the travel of designated Communist leaders to Moscow. But, particularly since 1956, this system has been supplemented by other methods. In early 1953, as a result of a decision reached at meetings held in Moscow in November 1952, a new authoritative journal of the International Communist Movement was established in Prague. This monthly journal known as Problems of Peace and Socialism is a virtual revival of the publication Communist International, which was the main theoretical journal of the COMINTERN until its suspension in 1943. Every effort is being made to emphasize that this journal is the joint property of all Communist parties, but control of the content and of the staff rests firmly in the hands of the CPSU. The Board "requests" representatives of other parties to produce articles on assigned topics for publication. The editorial board also organizes special meetings of Party leaders to discuss and agree on key questions of strategy and tactics, such as how to deal with the national bourgeoisie. It is also known that guidance on immediate tactical problems is given, more than in the past, by leading Soviet party figures attending Congresses of other Communist parties both in and outside the Soviet bloc. In other instances, official Soviet representatives abroad secretly instruct and confer with Communist Party leaders. Free World Communist figures who are considered completely reliable by Moscow are also again being used to a limited extent to transmit instructions. They are not yet being given continuing responsibilities for guidance work, as was the case with the old COMINTERN representatives. In addition, certain CPSU specialists working in given fields of activity have had

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conferences with local Communist leaders during visits to Latin America by official Soviet delegations.

Another significant development during the period under review is the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party as a source of international guidance. This supplements Soviet leadership, for, particularly since November 1957, the Soviet and Chinese parties are in fundamental agreement on the international strategy, and the Chinese have acknowledged the indispensability of the leadership of the CPSU. Latin American Communists are, particularly where tactical methods are involved, receiving more and more guidance from the Chinese party. The establishment of Chinese Communist representatives under various guises in Latin America may lead--as it has elsewhere--to conflicts in the advice given by Soviet and Chinese representatives on specific tactical questions. This problem has not yet been noted in Latin America, however.

Subsequent to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, many of the high Latin American party leaders visited China, where they attended the Eighth Congress of the CP China. Both before and after this congress, many of the party leaders attended courses dealing with the history and operational methods of the Chinese Communists, with particular emphasis on clandestine and illegal work, agrarian reform and work in rural areas, educational work, guerrilla warfare, and experiences in building the united front. Of particular importance to the Latin Americans, both as a security measure and as a means of executing the united liberation front tactics, was the advice of the Chinese CP on "how an illegal party can utilize legal possibilities." The Chinese pointed out that, despite illegalization, "all the members of a

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Party can engage in legal activities, thereby penetrating all sectors of society, establishing and maintaining links with the masses, and influencing various legal organizations, institutions and newspapers." Among the various rules for party work, the Chinese recommended that "all party members who work in legal organizations should patiently retain their legal position for a long time, without revealing their party affiliation, while they gain positions of power and influence. While taking part in the activities of these organizations, they should adapt their conduct, conversation, customs, dress, and mode of life to the requirements of their position, so as to safeguard the interests of the Party." The Chinese also emphasized the value of having overt and illegal activities carried out by non-party members, illustrating this by references to their own experiences in using Kuo. Sun Yat-sen and the author Lu Hsiang. The Latin American leaders were advised to study these and other experiences of the Chinese CP carefully and to adapt them where possible to their own party tactics. At the same time, the Chinese promised to aid the Latin American Communists by giving further training, ideological and tactical guidance, and also by providing sources of material support.

During the summer of 1956, we received information that several Latin American Communists were attending a special school in China, organized by the CCP exclusively for these Latin American trainees. Again, during this summer, we have heard that about half of the Latin American CP's were planning to send trainees to China to attend another special training course. We believe this.

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I must also mention one other recent development affecting CCP contacts with the Latin American CP's. We have heard that when the several Latin American Communist leaders were on their trip earlier this year, they were asked to help in carrying out plans for setting up a network of both legal and illegal correspondents in Latin America for the New China News Agency. This help was mainly the selection, for service as correspondents, of persons trusted by the respective CP's and who were, preferably, CP members. In view of the absence of Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments in Latin America, this scheme is an obvious method whereby the CCP can obtain detailed information concerning Latin America. At the same time, the trusted party contacts, who will be required to monitor and use Chinese radio broadcast material, can be used readily as a channel for transmitting directions and guidance provided in cryptic language by the Chinese party. This technique of guidance has been used in the past by the Communist movement during periods of violent struggle.

In the field of regional Party coordination, there is reason to believe that Latin America is being treated as two rather than one region. We have reliable information that in 1958 a meeting of about seven CP's of the northern portion of Latin America took place clandestinely; this meeting was devoted to common problems of these CP's and how they could best help one another and push their common programs. We know that a meeting involving CP's in the southern portion of the continent has also taken place, possibly more than once. It is possible that this may eventually involve some important differences in regional applications of the general strategy, since events in the northern group obviously have a more direct impact upon the United States.

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The upsurge in bilateral contacts between the Latin American CP's has involved virtually all of the parties in the entire area. These contacts have not necessarily followed a consistent pattern, although some CP's appear to have very close relations. The Costa Rican CP, for example, evidently has frequent contacts with neighboring CP's. The CP's of Venezuela and Colombia appear to be moving closer together. The Mexican CP functions in a supporting role for several CP's, especially with regard to travel, communications, and contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Certain parties have loaned experienced organizers to other parties, and in some cases individuals have been designated to serve as liaison agents. Perhaps the most interesting recent development has involved the efforts of many CP's to send representatives to consult with the Cuban CP. In view of the revolutionary developments in Cuba, and the opportunities available to the Cuban CP, this Party appears today to be one of the most influential in Latin America and one whose support and guidance is likely to be of great value to Communist parties in the area.

As a further comment--of a sensitive character--on the prospects for future action by the parties of Latin America, it has been noted that a number of Communist parties are not only giving more attention to secret work, but are also considering or actually developing paramilitary training programs. This, together with known Communist study of the experiences and techniques employed in guerilla operations in Cuba clearly suggests that the possibility of violent struggle is recognized and being provided for.

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